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This chapter provides an overview of closed-loop supply chains and remanufacturing activities.
A discussion of challenges in remanufacturing industry is presented, which motivates the work
in this thesis.
The global human population, prior to the Industrial Revolution, was around 300 million
at A.D. 1000, 500 million at A.D. 1500, and 790 million by A.D. 1750. The twentieth century
has witnessed extraordinary population growth where the world population increased from 1.65
billion to 6 billion and it is expected to be 9 million or more by the mid-twenty-first century
(United Nations, 1999).
The level of consumption by this growing population has also been continuously increasing.
As a result, the world now faces serious environmental and economical problems such as depletion
of natural resources, shortage of key minerals and metals, and waste with presence of toxic
materials (Pochampally et al., 2009).
For instance, in the EU, E-waste or Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE)
increases by 16-28% every five years, which is three times faster than average annual municipal
solid waste generation (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). In the US, it is esti-
mated that over 375 million empty toner cartridges and ink cartridges are thrown away as scrap
every year and most of these cartridges end up on landfill sites or in incinerators (Vasudevan et
al., 2012). Moreover, according to Environment Protection Agency (EPA), in 2009 about 2.37
million tons weighted TVs, computers, peripherals (including printers, scanners, fax machines)
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mice, keyboards, and cell phones were discarded. All these electronic products are made from
valuable resources, including precious and other metals, engineered plastics, glass, and other
materials, all of which require energy to source and manufacture.
As we are more exposed to these environmental issues, environmental consciousness has also
grown. The term sustainable development first stated in 1987 by the World Commission on
Environment and Development as “a development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own need” (WCED, 1987). For
sustainable development, in 2007, EU member states committed to a 20-20-20 initiative by
2020 which aims at a 20% increase in energy efficiency, a 20% reduction in global warming gas
emissions, and the generation of 20% of its energy needs with renewable forms of energy by 2020
(based on 1990 levels). Also, in 2003, to reduce e-waste, the EU enacted WEEE directives that
set collection, recycling and recovery targets for all types of electrical goods. And in the US,
there are more than 25 states with some form of take-back legislation for e-waste (Souza, 2013).
1.1 Closed-loop supply chains
Due to these legislative activities and increasing consumer awareness closed-loop supply chain
management and product recovery are becoming more important for corporations. Closed-
loop supply chain management is defined as the design, control, and operation of a system
to maximize value criterion over the entire life-cycle of a product with dynamic recovery of
value from different types and volumes of return over time. (Guide and Van Wassenhove,
2009). It is stated that a key to a corporation being environmentally responsible is minimizing
waste and recovery of materials used for manufacturing. This can prevent of waste and avoid
environmental costs before they occur. Material recovery systems include strategies such as
repairing, remanufacturing and recycling products (Guide, 2000).
Currently, recycling is the most commonly used strategy for product in the US (Giuntini
and Gaudette, 2003). For simple items such as beverage containers, steel products and paper
goods, recycling is a highly effective strategy. However, recycling a more complex product like
a car or a cellular phone results in a loss of up to 95 percent of the value added to the product.
Remanufacturing on the other hand, which can be interpreted as the ultimate form of recycling,
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conserves not only the raw material content but also much of the value added.
Remanufacturing is defined as the process of bringing used products to a “like-new” func-
tional state with warranty to match. Today, remanufacturing is practiced in various sectors
such as consumer electronics, toner cartridges, household appliances, machinery, cellular phones,
aerospace industry, etc. In these various sectors, although there may be differences in remanufac-
turing activities, there are three primary groups of activities in every case, namely, (1) product
returns management, (PRM) (2) remanufacturing operational issues, and (3) remanufactured
products market development (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2006). PRM includes product ac-
quisition management processes and focuses on the timing, quality, and quantity of returned
products and is defined as the front end of remanufacturing activities. Remanufacturing opera-
tional issues include reverse logistics; test, sort, and disposition activities; product disassembly
and remanufacturing processes. Remanufactured marked development which is defined as the
back end of remanufacturing activities, includes remarketing activities, channel choice, coordi-
nation, and market cannibalization issues.
1.2 Benefits of remanufacturing
Remanufacturing has numerous benefits for the environment and economies. In the UK, reman-
ufacturing is estimated to have a value of £5 billion and to represent UK-wide savings of 270,000
tones of raw materials and 800,000 tones of CO2 (Parker and Butler, 2007). Also, on a life cycle
basis, remanufacturing photocopiers consumes 20-70% less materials, water, and energy and
generates 35-50% less waste than conventional manufacturing (Toffel, 2004). For the original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), remanufacturing provides: savings in labor, material and
energy costs; shorter production lead times; balanced production lines; new market develop-
ment opportunities, and a positive, socially concerned image (McConocha and Speh, 1991). For
instance, OEMs that adopt remanufacturing are estimated to save 40 to 60 percent of the cost of
manufacturing a completely new product and in the 2008/2009 financial year, Fuji Xerox Aus-
tralia remanufactured more than 230,000 equipment parts, equating to a $6 million cost-saving
compared to sourcing new part (Dowlatshahi 2000). Additionally, adopting remanufacturing as
a part of the production strategy allowed Caterpillar to create a new market among contractors
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who cannot afford to buy a Caterpillar product outright (Gutowski et al., 2001). IBM Europe
and Xerox have reported that their product recovery activities have strengthened their brand
image. There is also an encouraging market for remanufactured products in the US. Already in
1997, approximately 73,000 US firms had sold an estimated $53 billion worth of remanufactured
products such as automotive parts, cranes and forklifts, furniture, medical equipment, pallets,
personal computers, photocopiers, telephones, toner cartridges etc. (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006).
1.3 Demand cannibalization
In the previous section, the potential benefits of remanufacturing were described. Despite all of
these benefits, firms often have reservations about adopting remanufacturing. One of the major
concern is that when the remanufactured product is sold on the same market as the new market,
it attracts the same customer population and thereby cannibalizes the sales of the new products.
The degree of (potential) cannibalization depends on the comparability of the new and re-
manufactured product. When remanufactured products are perfect substitutes for new products,
then each sale of a remanufactured product implies one less sale of a new item, and so remanufac-
turing is mainly used to reduce (re)manufacturing costs and increase profit margins. There exist
some product categories such as single-use cameras and refillable containers where remanufac-
tured items are indistinguishable from the new product. Also, in Japan Fuji Xerox incorporated
reused components in new products without labelling them as containing remanufactured com-
ponents (Matsumoto and Umeda, 2011). In all these cases, consumers perceive no distinction
between the remanufactured and new items, i.e., remanufactured items are perfect substitutes
for newly manufactured products. However, most of the remanufactured products are usually
sold at discounted prices and consumers can differentiate between a new and a remanufactured
product. For instance, Hewlett-Packard offers remanufactured (refurbished) computers with
40% discount and Dyson sells remanufactured vacuum cleaners with prices $100 below the price
of a new one. When a remanufactured product is sold at a discounted price, cannibalization
becomes a concern and firms consider this situation undesirable, especially when the margin on
the new product is higher than the margin on the remanufactured product. Thus, it is important
to jointly determine the prices of the new and remanufactured products to optimize the profit.
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1.4 Competition and cooperation in remanufacturing
External competition is another major issue for firms. Independent Operators (IOs) can com-
pete for returns and a share of the market for remanufactured products. In this case, OEMs
face external cannibalization rather than internal cannibalization, or both if the OEM itself
also remanufactures products. For instance, it is estimated that 95% of the remanufacturing
programs are not managed by the OEMs (Guide, 2000) and independent operators have a clear
dominance in the mobile phone and automobile parts remanufacturing industry. Moreover, it is
stated that it is very difficult for OEMs to enter the remanufacturing market after it becomes
dominated by IOs (Atasu et al., 2010).
Apart from competition, cooperation is also possible between the agents in a closed-loop sup-
ply chain, especially between those responsible for collecting the used-products. For instance,
some companies may prefer to collect used items directly from the customers but others may
prefer independent third parties (e.g., Genco) to handle used product collection. Also, in the
auto industry, independent third parties (i.e., dismantlers) are handling used-product collection
activities for the OEMs. Moreover, cooperation between OEMs is also possible. Blinsky (1995)
points out that the “big three” auto manufacturers in the US, namely Chrysler, GM and Ford,
have started to invest in joint research and remanufacturing partnerships with dismantling cen-
ters to benefit from scale economies and shared experience. Also, in 1990, Kodak established
alliances with Fuji and Konica at the collection facilities to collect returned single-used cameras
and in Japan, Fuji Xerox, Ricoh and Canon have formed partnerships to collect and return
each other’s used photocopier machines. Six printer ink and toner ink cartridge OEMs (Epson,
Canon, Hewlett-Packard, Brother, Dell, and Lexmark) have collaborated to collect used ink
cartridges (Matsumoto and Umeda, 2011).
1.5 Research objectives and questions
Potential benefits of remanufacturing were presented in the previous section, along with an
empirical discussion of remanufacturing practices in various sectors either by OEMs or IOs in
both in competitive and cooperative environments. However, most of the firms today do not have
a clear understanding for adopting remanufacturing and how to position / price a remanufactured
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product (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Atasu et al., 2008). Motivated by this, the main goal of
this thesis is to provide analytical tools to the firms for optimal pricing, manufacturing and
remanufacturing strategies. This goal is rather broad and to focus on the research, this thesis
addresses four specific research questions. These research questions are described in the following
paragraphs.
It is stated that to make remanufacturing economically attractive, one needs adequate quan-
tities of used products of the right quality and price, at the right time, as well as a market for
recovered products (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Accordingly, the first research question
deals with two aspects of the remanufacturing activities, namely, product acquisition manage-
ment and pricing of new and remanufactured products.
What is the optimal quantity and quality of the acquired cores and the price at which new
and remanufactured products are sold?
In addition to its presented benefits, remanufacturing may offer a better alternative to ca-
pacity constraint on new product manufacturing (Atasu et al., 2008) and the second research
question deals with profitability of remanufacturing in a capacitated setting.
What is the impact of remanufacturing on the optimal capacity and production decisions? If
remanufacturing is either more costly or more capacity intensive, can it still be profitable?
As it is describe previously, firms can both compete and cooperate in closed loop supply
chains. In the third research questions competition is considered.
What are the optimal production and pricing strategies of the parties in a supply chain in
the case of competition and what is the effect of competition on the remanufacturing strategy?
In research question four, motivated by the real life examples, cooperation of OEMs on
collecting the used items is considered.
When cooperation on collecting used items will be beneficial for OEMs? When does cooper-
ation lead to joint cost-savings, and how should these savings be allocated among the firms?
This thesis is organized as a collection of research papers centered around the main research
theme and each chapter consists a research paper that deals with a specific research question
listed above. Since the chapters of this thesis are devised also as a research paper that can
be read individually, there is some overlap in positioning the chapters. Each individual chapter
mathematically defines and formalizes a particular problem and determines the optimal solution
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to the developed model. The specific and relevant literature for each chapter is found within
the chapter itself. In the following section, we provide a brief outline of the thesis and state the
contributions of each research paper.
1.6 Thesis outline
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the first research question and combines
two aspects of remanufacturing activities namely, product acquisition management and mar-
keting (pricing) of the remanufactured products and this simultaneous consideration of product
acquisition management and marketing activities is the main contribution to the existing lit-
erature. A single OEM is considered in a single period setting and the OEM decides on the
acquisition prices offered for returns from different quality types and on selling prices of new
and remanufactured products. A procedure is developed to determine the optimal prices and
production amount. Also, a sensitivity study is conducted to understand the effect of different
model parameters on the optimal strategies and profit.
Chapter 3 deals with the second research question and investigates the effect of remanufac-
turing on capacity and production decisions. A two-period model with manufacturing in both pe-
riods and the option in the second period to remanufacture products that are returned/collected
at the end of the first period is analyzed which is inspired by the situation for a specific car
company. The main focus is on the setting where remanufacturing is less costly and less capac-
ity intensive than manufacturing. Optimal manufacturing and remanufacturing quantities are
derived and it is analyzed under what conditions (specified by costs, capacity restrictions and
demand) remanufacturing leads to increased total production. Later, the settings where reman-
ufacturing is either more costly or more capacity intensive than manufacturing is considered and
the results are compared to those of the main setting.
In Chapter 4, we consider competition between a single OEM and a single IO and analyze the
effect of competition on the optimal production and pricing strategies. Different from the existing
literature, in the presented model the OEM and IO compete not only for selling their products
but also for collecting returned products (cores) through their acquisition prices. The problem
is considered in a two-period setting with manufacturing by the OEM in the first period, and
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manufacturing as well as remanufacturing in the second period. Non-cooperative game theory
is used to find the optimal policies for both players in the second period. Then, the optimal
manufacturing decision for the OEM in the first period is determined. To gain insights on the
effect of system parameters on the optimal solution and the profitability of remanufacturing an
extensive numerical study is conducted.
In Chapter 5, the last question is addressed that considers cooperation between OEMs
on collecting the used items. In this chapter, the conditions where it is beneficial for OEMs
to cooperate by forming a coalition in setting up a returns network are determined. Using
cooperative game theory, an efficient allocation of cost savings between the parties is found.




Optimal core acquisition and pricing
strategies for hybrid manufacturing
and remanufacturing systems
In this chapter, we combine two aspects of remanufacturing, namely product acquisition manage-
ment and marketing (pricing) of the remanufactured products. We consider an original equip-
ment manufacturer (OEM) who decides on the acquisition prices offered for returns from differ-
ent quality types and on selling prices of new and remanufactured products, in a single period
setting. We develop a procedure for determining the optimal prices and corresponding profit of
the OEM, and conduct a sensitivity study to understand the effect of different model parameters
on the optimal strategies and profit. A counter-intuitive and an important managerial result is
that, for the optimal solution instead of having the same profit per remanufactured item for all
return types, the profit per item should be higher if the total cost for acquisition and remanufac-
turing is lower.
2.1 Introduction
Sustainable and environmental manufacturing processes have gained increasing attention both
from industry and academia over the last twenty years, since industrialization and population
9
growth have increasingly burdened the environment. To reduce this burden, European compa-
nies have been made legally responsible for collecting their end-of-life products and adopting the
sustainable production strategy of product recovery. Companies in other countries, including
the US, are not legally bound to collect used-products, but many still do so because of the
economic benefits (Kaya, 2010).
Remanufacturing is one of the product recovery processes and is defined as the process
of bringing used products to a “like-new” functional state with warranty to match. Today,
remanufacturing is practiced in various sectors such as consumer electronics, toner cartridges,
household appliances, machinery, cellular phones, aerospace industry, etc. In each of these
sectors, although variations exist in the reverse supply chain design, both products returns
management (PRM) and remanufactured products market development play vital roles (Guide
and Van Wassenhove, 2006).
PRM, which is the front end of a closed-loop supply chain, includes product acquisition
management processes and focuses on the timing, quality, and quantity of returned products.
A firm that operates a recoverable product system relies on PRM as the basic input to a
reuse system is product returns. A firm has two main options to obtain used products from
the end-users: the waste stream system and the market-driven system. In the waste stream
system, a firm passively accepts all products returns, which implies high uncertainty in the
quality of returns. However, with a market driven system where end-users are motivated to
return end-of-life products by financial incentives, firms can control the quality level of return
products (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2001). For instance, Dell, Apple, and ReCellular provide
a schedule of prices across various quantities and qualities of used products. Also, Robert Bosch
GmbH installed electronic data logs in their power tools to identify the residual quality of used
products and similar data logs are stated to be developed for other products such as large
household appliances (white goods) (Toffel, 2004). In this study, we focus on a market-driven
system that proactively sources used products at the optimal price and quality, as this has been
shown to be an important driver of the profitability of a closed-loop supply chain (Guide and
Van Wassenhove, 2009).
The back end of the closed-loop supply chain processes is the market development of reman-
ufactured products which includes remarketing activities, channel choice and coordination, and
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market cannibalization issues. There exist some product categories such as single-use cameras
and refillable containers where remanufactured items are perfect substitutes for newly manufac-
tured products. To the contrary, remanufactured mobile phones and PCs are sometimes sold to
completely different secondary markets. However, in most situations, markets partially overlap
and remanufactured products are sold at reduced prices. This explains why many firms have
reservations about adopting remanufacturing as a business strategy and particularly fear internal
cannibalization (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Firms consider this situation undesirable
especially when the margin on the new product is higher than the margin on the remanufactured
product. Thus, it is important to jointly determine the prices and production quantities of new
and remanufactured products in order to optimize the profit. However, as Ferguson and Toktay
(2006) and Atasu et al. (2008) state, most of the firms today do not have a clear understanding
for adopting remanufacturing and how to position / price a remanufactured product.
In this chapter, we consider both front end decisions on product acquisition management
and back end decisions on the marketing (pricing) of remanufactured products. Specifically, we
optimize the number and quality of the acquired cores and the price at which remanufactured
products are sold. The main contribution of the chapter is that we simultaneously consider both
types of decisions, whereas the existing literature consists of two (almost) separate streams, as
discussed in the next section. A counter-intuitive and an important managerial result is that,
for the optimal solution instead of having the same profit per remanufactured item for all return
types, the profit per item should be higher if the total cost for acquisition and remanufacturing
is lower.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related re-
manufacturing literature on product acquisition management and joint pricing of the new and
remanufactured products. Section 2.3 describes the system that we analyze. In Section 2.4, we
develop the algorithm for finding the optimal solution, and in Section 2.5 we conduct a sensi-
tivity analysis and a numerical study to understand the effects of the system parameters on the
optimal solution. Finally in Section 2.6, a brief summary of the findings and managerial insights
are provided, and avenues for further research are discussed.
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2.2 Related literature
There are numerous studies on closed-loop supply chains and remanufacturing in the current
literature. Early studies reviewed by Fleischmann et al. (1997) and Guide and Van Wassenhove
(2009) describe the evolution of the research on closed-loop supply chains. Tang and Zhou
(2012), Junior and Filho (2012) and Souza (2013) also provide extensive reviews of more recent
studies.
In this chapter, we focus on a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system in the
presence of different return types. Aras et al. (2004) and Ferguson et al. (2009) study the
value of categorizing returned products for such a system. Aras et al. (2004) assume that the
newly manufactured and remanufactured items are perfect substitutes and there is no capacity
restriction for remanufacturing. Ferguson et al. (2009) relax these assumptions and examine
the potential benefits for quality grading of returns. Different from these studies, we also focus
on product acquisition management where the quality of the returns depends on the acquisition
prices.
Product acquisition management has been widely considered in the remanufacturing liter-
ature. Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001) develop a framework for analyzing the profitability
of reuse activities and show the impact of product acquisition management on the profitability
of reuse activities. Based on this approach, Guide et al. (2003) build a mathematical model
by considering a remanufacturer in a single period where used products in multiple quality
categories (affecting the remanufacturing cost that is assumed to be fixed and known for each
category) are acquired from third-party brokers, and they determine the optimal selling price
and the acquisition prices that maximizes the profit rate. Galbreth and Blackburn (2006) relax
the assumption that the remanufacturing costs are fixed and allow for scrapping of some of the
acquired returns. They determine the optimal acquisition and sorting policies in the presence
of used product variability. Bakal and Akcali (2006) study the effect of random yield in reman-
ufacturing, where the yield depends on the acquisition price offered for used products. They
determine the optimal acquisition price for the end-of-life products and the selling price for
remanufactured parts. Vadde et al. (2007) consider a product recovery facility and determine
the optimal pricing strategy of reusable and recyclable components in the presence of legislation
that limits the disposal quantity. They consider both a single and multiple types of product
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returns and compare a proactive acquisition policy with a passive policy. All these studies focus
on a pure remanufacturing, whereas our focus is on a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing
system.
Minner and Kiesmu¨ller (2012) also consider a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing
system in a dynamic setting where demand can be satisfied with either newly manufactured
products or remanufactured products. They assume that demand is not price dependent and
there is no difference between the new and remanufactured products. Instead, we analyze a
model where new and remanufactured products are sold to different prices and these prices
affect the demand.
Front end decisions have received less attention in the remanufacturing literature, although
several assumptions about consumer’s perception and willingness to pay for remanufactured
products have been considered. On the one hand, some researchers assume that consumers see no
difference between new and remanufactured products such as Majumder and Groenevelt (2001),
Savaskan et al. (2004), Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), and Geyer et al. (2007). In these studies,
remanufactured products are assumed to be the perfect substitutes for the new products. On
the other hand, some researchers assume that the market for remanufactured and new products
are fully segmented and there is no cannibalization. In the middle, some researchers assume that
there exists partial cannibalization and remanufactured products competing with new products
on the basis of price, e.g., Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Debo et al. (2005), and Atasu et al.
(2008). In all these studies, the consumers’ willingness to pay for a remanufactured product is
assumed to be heterogeneous, uniformly distributed on a given scale, and lower than that of a
new product. We will take a similar approach.
Our main contribution to the existing remanufacturing literature is that we simultaneously
consider product acquisition management and pricing / positioning of remanufactured products.
2.3 The model
We consider a single period model for a single OEM. For the core acquisition side of the modeling,
we adopt a similar model used by Guide et al. (2003). We assume that there is no constraint
on the supply of the remanufactured products. Also, there is no setup cost for remanufacturing
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and no capacity constraint for manufacturing new products or remanufacturing acquired cores.
There are n different return types with respect to remanufacturability and minimal acquisi-
tion price. We denote ci as the unit remanufacturing cost of return type i and Ψi as the minimal
acquisition price below which there will be no returns for type i, and assume without loss of
generality that Ψ1 + c1 ≤ Ψ2 + c2 ≤ ... ≤ Ψn + cn holds. Since Ψi + ci is the minimum total cost
at which a core of type i can be acquired and remanufactured, we will refer to this order as the
preference order, where type 1 is the most preferred type and type n is the least preferred. The
return rate of type i is a linear function of the acquisition price, ai, given by R(ai) = αi(ai−Ψi).
All return types are assumed to be remanufactured up to the same standard and sold at the
same price which is defined as pr. The total amount of remanufactured product sales is denoted
by qr and the amount of new product sales by q0. We also assume that the number of products
manufactured by the OEM is positive, i.e., q0 > 0, which holds in most real-life settings. The
sales price for new products is defined as p0 and unit manufacturing cost of new product is
defined as c0.
Remanufactured products are distinguishable from new ones, and consumers have lower
willingness to pay for remanufactured products. For the inverse demand functions, we adopt
the same modeling as Debo et al. (2005) and Ferguson and Toktay (2006) where
p0 = 1− q0 − δqr, (2.1)
pr = δ(1− q0 − qr). (2.2)
The reasoning behind (2.1) and (2.2) is explained in detail in Appendix 2.A. A list of nota-
tions is given in Table 2.1.
It is obvious that it will not be optimal for the OEM to acquire (pay for) cores which will not








n Number of different return types
c0 Cost of manufacturing per new product
ci Cost of remanufacturing per return type i, i = {1, .., n}
Ψi Minimal acquisition price of return type i, i = {1, .., n}
αi Return rate coefficient of type i, i = {1, .., n}
δ Consumers’ relative willingness to pay for remanufactured product
(Decision) Variables
p0 Sales price of new products
pr Sales price of remanufactured products
ai Acquisition price offered per return type i, i = {1, .., n}
q0 Number of newly manufactured products
qr Number of remanufactured products
R(ai) Number of collected returns of type i, i = {1, .., n}
qi Number of remanufactured returns of type i, i = {1, .., n}
qtot Total production amount
m∗ Number of return types optimal to purchase
Other notations
Π OEM’s profit
x Denotes optimal solution for the unconstrained problem
xk Denotes optimal solution for the unconstrained problem when there are k types available
x∗ Denotes optimality, e.g., p∗n is the optimal selling price of new products
Table 2.1: Notations
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Then, the objective function becomes,
max Π = max
(qn,a1,..,an)
(1− q0 − δqr − c0) q0 (2.4)
+δ (1− q0 − qr) qr −
n∑
i=1
αi(ai −Ψi)(ai + ci)
s.t Ψi ≤ ai ∀i = 1, 2, .., n
q0 ≥ 0, qr ≥ 0
Proposition 2.3.1 The objective function Π is jointly concave in terms of the decision vari-
ables.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
We start our analysis with the unconstrained problem. Since the objective function is concave
as stated in Proposition 2.3.1, there exist a unique optimal solution of the unconstrained problem,
derived by simultaneously solving the first order conditions. Proposition 2.3.2 presents the
optimal solution of the unconstrained problem.
Proposition 2.3.2 For the unconstrained problem in (2.4), where there are n return types
available, the optimal values of the decision variables are
anj =
δc0 + δ(1− δ) (
∑n
i=1 αi(ci + Ψi + Ψj − cj)) + Ψj − cj






i=1 αi(ci + Ψi)
2 (1 + δ(1− δ)∑ni=1 αi) , (2.6)
qn0 =






, pnr = δ(p
n
0 − (1− δ)qnr ). (2.8)
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Note that the optimal values of the decision variables for the unconstrained problem when
there are k return types available, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n holds, are similar to those of presented in
Proposition 2.3.2.
From (2.8) we observe that pr ≤ δp0 must hold to ensure non-negative sales price for the




αi(δc0 − ci −Ψi) ≥ 0 (2.9)
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holds. Since αi > 0 for all i = {1, .., n}, (2.9) always holds when the condition δc0 ≥ ci +
Ψi for all i = {1, .., n} holds. This condition can be interpreted as that for which profitable
remanufacturing is possible, as otherwise the profit (sales price minus cost) per remanufactured
item would be below that of new item.
Also, the amount of newly manufactured products, q0, will be non-negative when
1− c0 > δ
n∑
i=1
αi(c0 − ci −Ψi − 1 + δ) (2.10)
holds. This condition implies that the profit per remanufactured item is not too high compared
to profit per new item, so that the OEM continues manufacturing instead of switching fully
to remanufacturing. As OEMs typically do not fully switch to remanufacturing, and will only
consider remanufacturing if it is profitable, we assume that (2.9) and (2.10) hold in what remains.
Moreover, using (2.5), we find that in the optimal solution of the unconstrained problem the
difference between the acquisition prices offered for two different return types only depends on
the minimal acquisition prices and remanufacturing cost for those types, i.e.,
ank − ani =
(Ψk −Ψi)− (ck − ci)
2
. (2.11)
This will turn out to be useful for developing a time-efficient algorithm in Proposition 2.3.4.
Due to ordering the classes with respect to the minimum required acquisition and remanu-
facturing cost plus in line with the findings of Guide et al. (2003), it is intuitively optimal to
only purchase in classes 1, ..,m for some m ∈ {1, .., n}. This is formalized in Lemma 2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.1 It can never be optimal to acquire cores of some type without purchasing cores
from all more preferred types as well.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Lemma 2.3.1 suggests that it only remains to be decided up to which preference class, m,
cores will be acquired. Lemma 2.3.2, which considers the effect of the number of available types
on the unconstrained (for that number) optimal acquisition prices, is useful to this end.
Lemma 2.3.2 As the number of types from which core are acquired increases from m−1 to m,
the difference between the acquisition prices offered to return type j will be
am−1j − amj =
δ(1− δ)αm (amm −Ψm)(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m−1i=1 αi) , ∀j = {1, ...,m− 1}.
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where am−1j and a
m
j are optimal acquisition prices offered for the unconstrained problem for return
type j when there are m− 1and m return types respectively.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Note that if the price difference in Lemma 2.3.2, am−1j − amj , is negative, then fewer (if any)
cores are acquired from return type j,j ∈ {1, ..,m− 1}, if type m is removed. So, if no cores are
acquired from type j with m types, then this will continue to be the case after removing type
m, or (inductively) removing even more types for j < m − 1. This is formalized and proven in
Proposition 2.3.3.
Proposition 2.3.3 For a given number of core types, m ≤ n, if there exists some k such that
a¯i − Ψi < 0 for i = k + 1, ...,m, then we never purchase cores of type i = k + 1, ...,m in the
global optimal solution.
Proof. Let a¯mi − Ψi < 0 for i = k + 1, ...,m. Then, Lemma 2.3.2 implies that a¯m−1i − a¯mi < 0
for i = 1, ...,m − 1 and this leads to the condition a¯m−1m−1 − Ψm−1 < 0 since a¯mm−1 − Ψm−1 < 0
holds. Then, by induction, we obtain that a¯k+1k+1 −Ψk+1 < 0 holds.
Proposition 2.3.3 is useful to find the global optimal solution efficiently, as it implies that
solutions that acquire cores from all classes up to j ∈ {k+1, ..,m} does not need to be considered
under the condition provided. Instead, the search procedure can jump from m to k. This leads
to the procedure to find the optimal solution that is presented in Proposition 2.3.4.
Proposition 2.3.4 The optimal prices and production amount are determined by the following
procedure.
Step 0. Set m = n.
Step 1. Compute the unconstrained solution with m types of cores by first determining a¯1 from
(2.5), then compute a¯i for i = 2, ..,m using relation in (2.11).
Step 2. Check a¯i − Ψi ≥ 0 for i = 1, ...,m, where a¯i is the unconstrained solution. If all m
conditions are satisfied, stop, the solution is optimal. If there exist any a¯i − Ψi < 0 for
i = 1, ...,m, go to Step 3.
Step 3 Define k = max{i : a¯i −Ψi ≥ 0}. If k = 1, stop; then let m = k and go back to Step 1.
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Proposition 2.3.4 determines the following optimal solution for where it is optimal to purchase
from m∗ return types, where 1 ≤ m∗ ≤ n holds. (The inequality 1 ≤ m∗ holds since δc0 ≥ ci+Ψi
for all i = {1, .., n} holds, i.e., OEM always requires returns from type 1 in the optimal solution.)
The global optimal solution is given as follows,
a∗j =
δc0 + δ(1− δ)
(∑m∗
i=1 αi(ci + Ψi + Ψj − cj)
)
+ Ψj − cj
2
(






i=1 αi(ci + Ψi)
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m∗i=1 αi) , (2.13)
q∗0 =









0 − (1− δ)q∗r ). (2.16)
An interesting observation from the optimal solution is that the optimal selling price of the
new product, p0, only depends on the manufacturing cost, c0, and so remanufacturing does not
affect sales price of the new products. This implies that in the optimal solution, the profit (sales
price minus cost) per new product is




which again only depends on c0. Remanufacturing does not affect the profit per new item. This is
in line with the results of Atasu et al. (2008). We next consider the profit per a remanufacturing
item.
Similarly, from (2.12), (2.13), (2.15), and (2.16) we obtain that
p∗r − (a∗i + ci) =
δ − ci −Ψi
2
, (2.18)
i.e., the profit per remanufactured type i core only depends on the cost structure of that
core type and consumers’ relative willingness to pay for the remanufactured product.
From (2.18) we also find that the profit earned per type i return does not depend on the cost
structure of the other return types. Moreover, the profit per core decreases with the minimum



















c0 ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘
cj ↘ ↗ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘
Ψj ↗ ↗ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘
δ ↗ ↗ ⊥ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗↘
Table 2.2: Effect of parameters on the optimal solution (↗: increasing,↘: decreasing, ⊥:
constant, ↗↘ : either increasing or decreasing)
2.4 Sensitivity analyses
In this section, we first analyze the effects of changes on parameters c0, cj , Ψj , and δ on the
optimal solution analytically. Afterwards, we determine more complicated effects of changes αj
on the optimal solution and the effect of all parameters on the profitability of remanufacturing
in a numerical study.
Table 2.2 summarizes the effect of c0, cj , Ψj , and δ on the acquisition price, the selling prices
and production quantities. The details of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Appendix 2.C.
Instead of repeating all these effects in words, we will describe and explain the most interesting
and combined effects.
If the remanufacturing cost of class j, cj , increases, then the acquisition price offered to that
class, a∗j , decreases; and the number of cores acquired from class j also decreases. However,
in order to partially compensate this decrease, as cj increases, the acquisition prices offered
for other return types increase. The total number of remanufactured items decreases with cj ,
which leads to an increase in the sales price for the remanufactured products and the amount
of manufacturing and a decrease in the total production.
An increase in the minimal acquisition price for type j, Ψj , leads to an increase in a
∗
j but
a decrease in q∗j . The effects of Ψj on the sales prices of the new and remanufactured products
and on the production quantities are similar to the effect of cj .
Finally, Table 2.2 shows that as the consumers willingness to pay for the remanufactured
products, δ, increases, remanufactured products are sold at higher prices as expected. Thus,
the OEM acquires and remanufactures more cores by setting higher acquisition prices, and
manufactures fewer new items. The total production can either increase or decrease with δ.
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Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
αi 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
ci 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
Ψi 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02
Table 2.3: Parameters used in the numerical study for different classes
For tractability reasons, further sensitivity analysis is conducted in a numerical study to
understand the effect of parameters on the optimal pricing and production decisions and also
on the profitability of remanufacturing. We consider a base case and study the effect of the
parameters in our model by varying one parameter at a time. In the base case, similar to
the study in Guide et al. (2003), there are six return types, i.e., n = 6. Return coefficients,
remanufacturing costs, and minimal acquisition prices for each six classes used in the base
case are given in Table 2.3. Note that c1 + Ψ1 ≤ ... ≤ c6 + Ψ6 holds. For every parameter,
we consider two alternative values below and two above the base value. Table 2.4 shows all
considered parameter values.
The reasoning behind using these values is as follows. Subramanian and Subramanyam
(2012) find that consumers’ relative willingness to pay for remanufactured products ranges from
0.60 to 0.85. In line with their findings, in the base case we take δ = 0.7 and consider δ values
from 0.60 to 0.85. In this section, we only present the effect of changes in α2, c2 and Ψ2, since
changes in αi, ci and Ψi for i 6= 2 will lead to similar insights. Also, we consider type 2 class to
understand how a change in the availability of a certain return type affects decisions for more
and less preferred return types. To investigate a broad range for the availability of a core type
2, we vary α2 from 0.01 to 5. We remark that (2.9) and (2.10) hold for all considered parameter
settings.
Table 2.5 summarizes the effect of α2 on the optimal solution. We find that as α2 increases,
implying that it becomes easier to collect cores of type 2, more cores are indeed acquired of this
type. However, to compensate, fewer new products and remanufactured products from other
core types are produced, and all acquisition prices are reduced.
We next look at the effect of parameters on the OEM’s optimal profit and on the relative
percentage gain from remanufacturing compared to the non-remanufacturing model. It is easy
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c0 c2 Ψ2 α2 δ
0.55 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.6
0.6 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.65
0.65 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.7
0.7 0.17 0.15 0.5 0.75
0.75 0.19 0.17 5 0.85
Table 2.4: Parameters used in the numerical study where base values are indicated in
bold
α2 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.5 5
a∗1 0.282 0.282 0.280 0.276 0.242
a∗2 0.212 0.212 0.210 0.206 0.172
a∗3 0.112 0.112 0.110 0.106 0
a∗4 0.077 0.077 0.075 0.071 0
a∗5 0.042 0.042 0.041 0 0
a∗6 0 0 0 0 0
p∗n 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825
p∗r 0.573 0.572 0.570 0.566 0.532
q∗0 0.158 0.156 0.151 0.135 0.023
q∗r 0.024 0.027 0.034 0.057 0.217
q∗tot 0.182 0.183 0.185 0.192 0.240
Table 2.5: Effect of α2 on the optimal acquisition and sales prices, and on optimal pro-
duction quantities
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c0 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
m∗ 2 4 5 5 6
% Gain 11.6 23.3 49.5 101.8 212.9
δ 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.85
m∗ 3 4 5 5 6
% Gain 20.2 31.4 49.5 74.4 151.48
c2 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.19
m∗ 4 4 5 5 5
% Gain 54.1 52.2 49.5 47.7 45.9
Ψ2 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17
m∗ 4 5 5 5 5
% Gain 53.2 51.3 49.5 47.7 45.9
α2 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.50 5
m∗ 5 5 5 4 2
% Gain 35.6 39.7 49.5 82.0 290.0
Table 2.6: Effect of parameters on profitability of remanufacturing (The “gain” is the
percentage increase in OEM profits from the using remanufacturing option)
to see that without remanufacturing the optimal profit is Π∗non = (1 − c0)2/4. So the relative
percentage gain from remanufacturing is given by (Π∗ −Π∗non)/Π∗non.
The effects of parameters on the optimal number of return types and the profitability of
remanufacturing are presented in Table 2.6. It appears that as manufacturing becomes more
costly, the OEM purchases cores from more return types and the gain from remanufacturing
increases. The profit of the OEM, Π∗, may either increase or decrease with c0. Table 2.6 also
shows that as consumers are willing to pay more for the remanufactured products, remanu-
facturing becomes more profitable and the OEM purchases cores from more return types. As
remanufacturing a return from any type becomes more costly (an increase in c2 or Ψ2), the gain
from remanufacturing decreases and the OEM is more inclined to also purchase cores from less
preferred types. Finally, as there are more type-2 returns available, i.e., as α2 increases, the
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OEM acquires more returns from that type and the gain from remanufacturing increases.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we combine two aspects of remanufacturing activities namely, product acquisition
management and pricing of the new and remanufactured products. We consider an OEM that
manufactures new items as well as remanufactures returned items. Returned items are classified
into different types and the OEM decides both on how much to purchase from each return
type (with the acquisition prices offered) and under which price to sell new and remanufactured
items, where consumers have lower willingness to pay for the remanufactured items. We derive
a procedure to find the closed-form optimal solution. In line with the results of Atasu et al.
(2008), we find that the direct profit per a new item only depends on the manufacturing cost.
We also find that for the optimal solution, instead of having an equal profit per remanufactured
item from all return types, the profit per item is higher for more preferred return types. This
is an important observation, as practitioners may find it intuitive and/or fair to apply equal
profits, but doing so is suboptimal.
We conclude by pointing out future research directions, related to the limiting assumptions
in our model. First of all, we assume a single period setting. Two or multiple period settings can
be considered where the number of available returns in a period depends on the product sales
in the prior period. Secondly, different selling prices for different core types can be considered.
Finally, we inclusion of a competing third party remanufacturer in order to study the impact of
competition on firms’ optimal behaviors and profit performance can be considered.
Appendix 2.A: Derivation of the Inverse Demand Func-
tions
It is assumed that each consumer uses at most one unit. His/her willingness to pay for that
single unit, θ, is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. Then, the net utility of a consumer,
NU , is given by
NU = δmθ − pz,
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where m = 0 and z = 0 if the product is new, and m = 1 and z = r if the product is remanufac-
tured. A consumer has three different strategies, based on the value of NU, namely, purchase a
new product, strategy N, purchase a remanufactured product, strategy R, and purchase nothing,
strategy X. We can derive the inverse demand functions where the market size is normalized to
1. First, we consider the consumer who is indifferent between strategy R and X. In this case,
θ = 1− q0 − qr and this gives
NUR = δ(1− q0 − qr)− pr = 0 = NUX ,
which implies, pr = δ(1− q0 − qr). Then, we consider the consumer who is indifferent between
strategy N and R. In this case, θ = 1− q0 and this gives
NUN = 1− q0 − p0 = δ(1− q0)− pr = NUR,
where pr = δ(1− q0 − qr). This implies, p0 = 1− q0 − δqr.
Appendix 2.B: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
To show that the function is concave, we should show that the Hessian is negative definite.



















From these conditions the Hessian matrix is
H =

−2 −2δα1 −2δα2 ... −2δαn
−2δα1 −2α1(δα1 + 1) −2δα1α2 ... −2δα1αn




















It is known that an n × n symmetric matrix is negative definite if the determinants of the
principal minors have alternating signs starting with a negative sign. Furthermore, elementary
row operations will not change the value of a determinant. First, by multiplying row 1 with −αj
and adding to row 1 + j for ∀j ∈ {1, .., n} we obtain the following matrix :
H ′ =

−2 −2δα1 −2δα2 ... −2δαn
2δα1(1− δ) −2α1 0 ... 0
















2δαn(1− δ) 0 0 ... −2αn

.
Then, by multiplying row k + 1 with −2 and adding to row 1 for ∀k ∈ {1, .., n} we obtain the










0 0 ... 0
2δα1(1− δ) −2α1 0 ... 0
















2δαn(1− δ) 0 0 ... −2αn

.
The determinant of a lower triangular matrix is equal to the multiplication of its diagonal
elements. Thus, determinants of principal minors will have alternating signs, starting with a
negative sign. So we conclude that the Hessian is negative definite and the function is concave.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Since the function is concave, the simultaneous solution of the following first order conditions
will give the unique optimal solution for the unconstrained problem.
∂Π
∂q0
= 1− 2qn − 2δ
n∑
i=1










− αj(2aj −Ψj + cj) = 0 ∀j = {1, .., n}.(2.20)
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From equation (2.19) we find that
2q0 = 1− 2δ
n∑
i=1
αi(ai −Ψi)− c0. (2.21)




αi(ai −Ψi)− αj(2aj + cj −Ψj) + δαjc0 = 0. (2.22)
Solving (2.22) for aj gives
aj =
δc0 − 2δ(1− δ)
∑k
i=1 αi(ai −Ψi) + Ψj − cj
2
. (2.23)
Using (2.3), we can rewrite (2.23) as
aj =













δc0 − 2δ(1− δ)q∗r −Ψj − cj
2
)
= q∗r . (2.25)






i=1 αi(ci + Ψi)
2 (1 + δ(1− δ)∑ni=1 αi) . (2.26)
Substituting (2.26) into (2.24) gives a∗j . The value for p
∗
0 can be found by substituting (2.21) in
to (2.1).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
For 1 ≤ i < k < n, combining
ai −Ψi =









1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj)
and
ak −Ψk =









1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj)
we get
(ak −Ψk)− (ai −Ψi) =









1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj)
−







































1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj)
=
δ(1− δ)
(ci + Ψi −Ψk − ck)∑nj=1
j 6=k
j 6=i
αj + (αi + αk)(ci + Ψi −Ψk − ck)
−Ψk − ck + Ψi + ci
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj)
=




−Ψk − ck + Ψi + ci
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑nj=1 αj) =
−Ψk − ck + Ψi + ci
2
≤ 0,(2.27)
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that ci + Ψi ≤ ck + Ψk. Thus, it can never
be optimal to buy from class k but not from some class i < k.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
Using (2.5) we get
am−1j − amj =
δc0 + δ(1− δ)
(∑m−1
i=1 αi(ci + Ψi + Ψj − cj)
)
+ Ψj − cj
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m−1i=1 αi)
−δc0 + δ(1− δ) (
∑m
i=1 αi(ci + Ψi + Ψj − cj)) + Ψj − cj




δc0 + δ(1− δ)
(∑m−1






1 + δ(1− δ)∑m−1i=1 αi) (1 + δ(1− δ)∑mi=1 αi)
=
δ(1− δ)αm (amm −Ψm)(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m−1i=1 αi) .
Appendix 2.C: Sensitivity analyses
The optimal solution for a given number of classes are given in Proposition 2.3.4. In the following
sections, we present the details of the sensitivity analyses for c0, ci, Ψi, and δ.
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1 + δ(1− δ)∑m∗i=1 αi) < 0.










































































= − (1− δ)αj
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m∗i=1 αi) < 0.










tot increase, and p
∗
0 does not
change. Also, as ck increases, a
∗
j increases.











































































= − (1− δ)αj
2
(
1 + δ(1− δ)∑m∗i=1 αi) < 0.
Therefore, as Ψj increases, q
∗








tot increase, and p
∗
0 does not
change. Also, as Ψk increases, a
∗
j increases.
Sensitivity analysis w.r.t δ










i=1 αi + (1− 2δ)(
∑m∗
i=1 αi(ci + Ψi))





























1 + δ(1− δ)∑m∗i=1 αi)2 > 0.
From (2.9) it is known that
∑m∗










Thus, as δ increases, q0 decreases.
Let
∑m∗
i=1 αi = A and
∑m∗




c0 +B − 2δ2A− 2δB + δ2A2 − 2δ3A2 + δ4A2 + 1 + 2δA+ δ2c0A
2(1 + δA− δ2A)2
=
δA(2(1− δ) + δA(1− δ)2) + δ(δc0A−B) + 1 + c0 +B(1− δ)
2(1 + δA− δ2A)2 > 0,
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Ac0(1− δ) +AB(1− δ)2 − (δc0A−B)
2(1 + δA− δ2A)2
which can be both negative and positive.
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Chapter 3
Capacity and production decisions
under a remanufacturing strategy
This chapter is published as Caner, Zhu, and Teunter (2013), Capacity and production decisions
under a remanufacturing strategy, International Journal of Production Economics.DOI:
10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.04.052.
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of remanufacturing on capacity and production de-
cisions. Inspired by the situation for a specific car company, we analyze a two-period model with
manufacturing in both periods and the option in the second period to remanufacture products
that are returned/collected at the end of the first period. We first and foremost focus on the
case where remanufacturing is less costly and less capacity intensive than manufacturing. This
setting is realistic and obviously the one where remanufacturing is most beneficial. Optimal man-
ufacturing and remanufacturing quantities are derived and it is analyzed under what conditions
(specified by costs, capacity restrictions and demand) remanufacturing leads to increased total
production. We also consider the cases where remanufacturing is either more costly or more
capacity intensive than manufacturing, and contrast the results the those of our main case. One
particularly insightful find is that remanufacturing is seldom (very) profitable if it is more costly




Over the last 50 years, the level of consumption by growing population has been continuously
increasing. As a result, the world now faces serious environmental problems such as waste
with presence of toxic materials and depletion of natural resources (Pochampally et al., 2009).
Driven by legislation and societal pressure to mitigate these environmental problems, and also
by economic incentives, more and more firms are starting remanufacturing operations next to
the traditional manufacturing operations (Tang and Teunter, 2006).
Remanufacturing is the process of bringing used products to a “like-new” functional state
with warranty to match. It has numerous benefits for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs),
such as savings in labor, material and energy costs. By adopting remanufacturing firms can save
between 40% and 60% of the cost of manufacturing a new product while using only 20% of the en-
ergy (Guide et al., 1997). In the 2008/2009 financial year, Fuji Xerox Australia remanufactured
more than 230,000 equipment parts, equating to a $6 million cost-saving compared to sourcing
new parts. Furthermore, remanufacturing leads to shorter production lead times; balanced pro-
duction lines; new market development opportunities, and a positive, socially concerned image
for firms (McConocha and Speh, 1991). Caterpillar created a new market among contractors
who cannot afford to buy a Caterpillar product outright by adopting remanufacturing as a part
of production strategy (Gutowski et al., 2001). In addition to these benefits, remanufacturing
may offer a better alternative to capacity constraint on new product manufacturing (Atasu et
al., 2008).
In this chapter, we consider remanufacturing in a two-period, capacitated production setting
and our aim is to determine the effect of remanufacturing on capacity and production. More
specifically, we address the following questions.
1) Under what conditions is remanufacturing profitable? If remanufacturing is either more
costly or more capacity intensive, can it still be profitable?
2) What is the impact of remanufacturing on the optimal capacity and production decisions?
3) How will market conditions and cost structures effect the profitability of remanufacturing?
We construct a model to optimize capacity, manufacturing and remanufacturing decisions.
The model is motivated by a specific case company which manufactures and remanufactures car
parts (Tang and Teunter, 2006). The details of the case and mathematical model are described
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in the next section.
Capacity management has been widely studied in the supply chain literature. The three
main areas that have been addressed are production, inventory and demand management; real
options; and risk sharing and vertical integration between suppliers and buyers through capacity
reservation contracts. Wu et al. (2005) provide an extensive review on capacity expansion tactics
in the high-tech industry.
There are numerous studies on closed-loop supply chains and remanufacturing in the current
literature. Fleischmann et al. (1997) provide an excellent review and Guide and Van Wassenhove
(2009) describe the evolution of the research on closed- loop supply chains. A recent survey on
production planning and control for remanufacturing is provided by Junior and Filho (2012). In
the remanufacturing literature, there are relatively few studies that consider capacitated settings.
In this literature stream some studies only focus on the planning remanufacturing activities
capacities without considering production capacity of new products. For instance, Guide et al.
(1997) consider remanufacturing capacity by taking into account material recovery rates and
stochastic routings, and they evaluate the performance of several capacity planning techniques.
Aksoy and Gupta (2001) analyze the trade-off between increasing the number of buffers and
increasing the capacity at the remanufacturing stations with uncertainties in the operational
environment. They use an open queuing network to model the remanufacturing system. Franke
et al. (2006) consider remanufacturing capacity for the mobile phone industry. They introduce
a linear programming model for the planning of remanufacturing capacities and production
programs. Georgiadis et al. (2006) analyze capacity expansion/contraction of collection and
remanufacturing activities considering product lifecyle and return patterns. They adopt system
dynamics methodology to derive dynamic capacity planning policies. Another study that uses
system dynamics methodology is conducted by Vlachos et al. (2007). They study the long-term
behavior of reverse supply chains with remanufacturing, and propose efficient remanufacturing
and collection expansion policies. They also include specific external factors such as obligations
and penalties imposed by legislation that influence profits, costs and flows. Different from these
studies, we consider production capacity for both new and remanufactured products.
Other studies that consider capacitated production setting for both new and remanufactured
products do exist. Debo et al. (2006) analyze the introduction and management of remanu-
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factured products considering life-cycles of products. They also focus on capacitated settings
and try to understand the impact of the product diffusion rate on the capacity requirements
for new and remanufactured products. Additionally, they investigate the relative value of flex-
ible capacity which can be used to both manufacture and remanufacture products, compared
to dedicated capacity for each activity. Bayindir et al. (2003) investigate the conditions on
different system parameters, including capacity of the production facility, for which the reman-
ufacturing option provides cost benefits. They model the production environment as a queuing
network, where manufacturing and remanufacturing require both common and separated oper-
ations. They also assume that there is no difference between remanufactured and manufactured
products. Bayindir et al. (2007) relax this assumption and investigate the profitability of having
a remanufacturing option when the manufactured and remanufactured products are segmented
to different markets and production capacity is finite. They consider a single period profit model
where the retail price of the new and remanufactured products are fixed. Rubio and Corominas
(2008) consider a lean production environment with known and constant demand, and propose
a model where manufacturing and remanufacturing capacities can be adjusted. Different from
these studies, we investigate the effect of remanufacturing on capacity and production (pricing)
decisions in a two-period setting that consists of a growth phase and a maturity phase for a
product. Two-period models have been used in the remanufacturing literature in several studies
including these, by Majumder and Groenevelt (2001), Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Ferrer and
Swaminathan (2006), and Webster and Mitra (2007). In these studies, it is assumed that there
is infinite production capacity of new and remanufactured products whereas in this chapter, we
consider a capacitated setting.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the motivating
case and describes the corresponding model in detail. We characterize the optimal policy for
the case in which remanufacturing is less costly as well as less capacity intensive compared to
manufacturing in Section 3.3. We further conduct a sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution
in Section 3.4 to understand the effect of each parameter on the optimal solution. Also, by
comparing to the case where the OEM only manufactures, we gain insights into the effect of
remanufacturing on total production, capacity investment and retail prices. In Section 3.5, we
relax the assumption that remanufacturing reduces both cost and capacity requirements. We
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again characterize optimal policies and also study numerically whether remanufacturing can still
be profitable in such cases in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 ends with a brief summary of the findings,
managerial insights, and avenues for further research.
3.2 Model
In this section, we first introduce the details of the motivating case then construct the mathe-
matical model with related assumptions.
The motivating case for this chapter is a specific car company whose major products are diesel
engines, petrol engines, water pumps, cylinder heads, crankshafts, and short blocks. For this
study, we focus on a specific product, the water pumps for diesel engines. The remanufacturing
processes are very similar to those for manufacturing except for the source of the materials,
therefore both manufacturing and remanufacturing are performed on the same production line.
In the mathematical model we assume that the product life-cycle is split into two periods
which we can interpret in the following way. In the first period (growth phase), the OEM
builds its production capacity and introduces the new product to the market. The number
of manufactured new products, q1n, in that period is, of course, restricted by the production
capacity Q, i.e., q1n ≤ Q. In the second period (maturity phase) the product is already in the
market and sales continue. Also, the returns from the first period’s sales (where γ denotes the
fraction that are returned) are received. In the second period, capacity is fixed (from the first
period). We do allow the second period to have a different length than the first. Letting θ denote
its relative length compared to that of the first period, this gives a capacity of manufacturing
θQ new products in the second period. However, an OEM can use part of that capacity to
remanufacture used products that are returned/collected at the end of period 1.
The relative capacity requirement for remanufacturing (per remanufactured product) is de-
noted by τ . So, letting q2n and q2r denote the manufactured and remanufactured products in
period 2, we get the following capacity restriction for period 2:
q2n + τq2r ≤ θQ.
Remanufactured water pumps are sold with the same quality and warranty as the new
product and OEM offers a (fixed) discount per remanufactured product. Newly manufactured
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and remanufactured water pump are used to fulfill the demand for spare parts for engines and
demand for new engine assembly. The buyers are assumed to be indifferent between purchasing
a newly manufactured product and a remanufactured product that is sold at a fixed discount.
To avoid unnecessary notation, we include that “discount” for remanufactured products in our
model by adding it to the remanufacturing cost, cr and use the same selling price for new and
remanufactured products.
The relevant costs are those for building capacity (co per unit of capacity), for manufactur-
ing (cn per product) and for remanufacturing (cr per product). We remark that the model and
analysis can easily be generalized from a linear capacity cost function to a general convex func-
tion. Additionally, cr is composed of material cost, acquisition cost for cores and the discount as
explained. The market share in both periods is based on to the following linear demand model,
where Mi is the market size, ai is the price sensitivity factor and pi the selling price, in period i.
qi = Mi − aipi, i = 1, 2.
or equivalently,
pi = (Mi − qi)/ai, i = 1, 2.
To ensure nonnegative selling prices both in period 1 and 2, we require q1 ≤M1 and q2 ≤M2.
Obviously, remanufacturing is particularly interesting for OEMs if it is less costly and less
capital-intensive than manufacturing. For this reason, we first assume that cn > cr and τ < 1
and find the optimal solution in the next section. In Section 3.5, we relax this assumption and
also analyze the cases where remanufacturing is either more costly or more capacity intensive
than manufacturing.
To simplify the presentation of the analysis and results, we assume in what remains that
the capacity in period 2 is sufficient for remanufacturing all available returns (and manufacture
some new items), i.e., θ ≥ τγ. This is realistic as both τ and γ are typically considerably smaller
than 1, and the maturity phase not (very) short compared to the growth phase.
The objective is to maximize the total profit over both periods, where revenues and costs in
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the second period are discounted with factor β. In mathematical terms, we have
max Π2(p2, q2n, q2r) = p2q2 − cnq2n − crq2r, (3.1)
q2 = q2n + q2r,
q2n + τq2r ≤ θQ,
q2r ≤ γq1n,
q2n ≥ 0, q2r ≥ 0.
for period 2, and
Π1(q1n, Q) = (p1 − cn)q1n − coQ+ βΠ∗2(q1n, Q), (3.2)
q1n ≤ Q,
q1n ≥ 0, Q ≥ 0
for period 1, where Π∗2(q1n, Q) denotes the maximum profit in period 2 given q1n and Q.
A list of notations is given in Table 3.1. In addition to parameters and variables introduced
previously, some extra expressions that will turn out to be useful for the analysis are included.
The marginal production cost in period 1 if there is sufficient capacity in period 2, including
future cost savings of remanufacturing βγ(cn − cr), is denoted by ∆0 = cn + co − βγ(cn − cr).
If there is insufficient capacity in period 2, the marginal benefit of capacity increase in period 1
is co[θ + (1− τ)γ]/θ. Since the marginal cost in period 1 is co, the unit capacity cost saving of
remanufacturing is
co[θ + (1− τ)γ]/θ − co = co(1− τ)γ/θ.
Thus, ∆1 = cn − coγ(1 − τ)/θ − βγ(cn − cr) is the marginal production cost in period 1
if there is insufficient capacity in period 2. Moreover, Ψ1 is the desirable production quantity
(including both new and remanufacturing quantities) and Ψ2 is the desirable remanufacturing
quantity in period 2 without capacity constraint. Further explanation of Ψ1 and Ψ2 will be
provided in the next section.
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θ Relative length of the second period compared to the first
τ Relative capacity requirement of remanufacturing
Mi, i = 1, 2 Market size in period i
pi, i = 1, 2 Selling price in period i
qin, i = 1, 2 Number of new products manufactured in period i
q2r Number of used products remanufactured in period 2
qi, i = 1, 2 Total number of products produced in period i (q1 = q1n, q2 = q2n + q2r)
Q Production capacity (in period 1)
cn Manufacturing cost (per unit)
cr Remanufacturing cost (per unit)
co Capacity cost (per unit)
γ Return rate
ai, i = 1, 2 Price sensitivity factor in period i
β Discount factor for period 2
∆0 cn + co − βγ(cn − cr)












3.3 Optimal policy if remanufacturing is less costly
and less capacity intensive
In the main text, we discuss the most realistic case where (a) manufacturing in period 2 can be
profitable, i.e., M2 > a2cn; and (b) manufacturing in period 1 can be profitable, i.e., M1 > a1∆0.
The details of the characterization of the optimal policy under these conditions is given in
Appendix 3.A, and the characterization of the optimal policy if either of these assumptions does
not hold given in Appendix 3.C.
The solution procedure is as follows. We start by finding the optimal manufacturing and
remanufacturing quantities in period 2 given values for the capacity and the manufacturing
quantity in period 1. It will appear that multiple cases have to be considered, depending
on whether or not capacity and non negativity constraints are binding. Before considering
the different cases, we start with the following proposition regarding to OEM’s preference for
remanufacturing over manufacturing in period 2.
Proposition 3.3.1 In period 2, the OEM does not manufacture new products as long as cores
are available for remanufacturing.
In our setting (see Section 3.2) where remanufacturing is less expensive than manufacturing
(i.e., cr < cn) and requires less capacity (as τ < 1), this proposition obviously holds. It also
follows directly from the profit function in (3.1).
If we ignore the constraints in (3.1), then it is easy to see that the optimal remanufacturing
quantity is Ψ2 = (M2−a2cr)/2. Combined with Proposition 3.3.1, this implies that it is optimal
to remanufacture Ψ2 returns when available and all returns otherwise. Recall from Section 3.2
that the capacity is always sufficient to remanufacture all returns (and manufacture some new
items). Furthermore, it also directly follows from (3.1) that if the number of returns (γq1n) is
less than Ψ1 = (M2 − a2cn)/2, then it is optimal to remanufacture all returns and additionally
manufacture Ψ1 − γq1n new items, or if there is insufficient capacity, manufacture as many as
possible.
Using Ψ2 and Ψ1, we next distinguish multiple cases that differ in production type and
capacity availability. If γq1n < Ψ1, then all returns are remanufactured and some additional
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Capacity availability (Re)manufacturing
Case Period 1 Period 2 Period 2
1 Surplus (q1n < Q) Shortage ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ < Ψ1) All returns, some new (γq1n < Ψ1)
2 Match (q1n = Q) Shortage ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ < Ψ1) All returns, some new (γq1n < Ψ1)
3 Surplus (q1n < Q) Match ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ = Ψ1) All returns, some new (γq1n < Ψ1)
4 Match (q1n = Q) Match ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ = Ψ1) All returns, some new (γq1n < Ψ1)
5 Match (q1n = Q) Surplus ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ > Ψ1) All returns, some new (γq1n < Ψ1)
6 Match (q1n = Q) Surplus ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ > γq1n) All returns, no new (γq1n = Ψ1)
7 Match (q1n = Q) Surplus ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ > γq1n) All returns, no new (Ψ1 < γq1n ≤ Ψ2)
8 Match (q1n = Q) Surplus ((1− τ)γq1n + θQ > γq1n) Some returns, no new (γq1n > Ψ2)
Table 3.2: Description of policies for eight cases
new items (up to Ψ1, depending on capacity) are manufactured in period 2. This gives three
cases depending on whether there is a capacity shortage, match or surplus. The first two cases
are each split into two subcases depending on whether there is a capacity match (q1n = Q) or
surplus (q1n < Q) in period 1. Obviously, there cannot be a capacity shortage in period 1. Also,
it cannot be optimal to have a capacity surplus in both periods, and therefore there has to be
a capacity match in period 1 for the case with a capacity surplus in period 2. This leads to five
cases for γq1n < Ψ1 that are numbered 1-5 in Table 3.2.
If Ψ1 ≤ γq1n ≤ Ψ2, then all returns are remanufactured and no new items are manufactured.
It will appear that the analysis of this situation is different for γq1n = Ψ1 and Ψ1 < γq1n ≤ Ψ2,
and therefore we consider these as separate cases, numbered 6 and 7, respectively. Finally (case
8), if γq1n > Ψ2 then some but not all returns are remanufactured. For cases 6-8, there is a
capacity surplus in period 2 (as the capacity is always sufficient to remanufacture all returns
and manufacture some new items - see Section 3.2), and therefore there has to be a capacity
match in period 1.
In order to find the global optimal solution, we must find the local optimal solution for every
separate case and compare the associated profits. The analysis is straightforward but tedious,
and given in Appendix 3.A. It turns out that all cases except 3 can be optimal, and that the
optimality conditions are as given in Table 3.3.
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Case Optimality Condition
1 M2 − a2cn > [θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ
2 [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn ≤ [θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ
4 M2 − a2cn = γ(M1 − a1∆0)
5 γ(M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn < [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0)
6 M2 − a2cn = [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0)
7 M2 − a2cn < γ(M1 − a1∆0),M2 − a2cr ≥ γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)]
8 M2 − a2cr < γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)]
Table 3.3: Optimality conditions for all cases
Note from Table 3.3 that the optimality conditions are all linear in the market sizes of both
periods, which leads us to the graphical presentation of the optimal market sizes in Figure 3.1.
This figure contains five Regions corresponding to cases 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8, which we will refer
to as Regions I-V in this order. As can been seen from Table 3.3, cases 4 and 6 correspond to
a line rather than a region in Figure 3.1. Indeed, case 4 is optimal on the boundary between
Regions II and III, and case 6 is optimal on the boundary between Regions III and IV. Note
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Figure 3.1: Optimality Regions
from Figure 3.1 that for any large enough value of the market size in period 1, the optimal
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solution starts in Region V for very small market sizes M2 in period 2, and moves to Regions
IV, III, II and I, in this order, as M2 increases. This is explained as follows. If the market
size in period 2 is smaller than that in period 1, there is a sufficient supply of returns to be
remanufactured so that manufacturing is not needed. Indeed, for a very small market size only
part of the returns is remanufactured (Region V), but for M2 large enough it becomes profitable
to remanufacture all returns (Region IV) as the sales price increases with the market size. Since
manufacturing is more costly than remanufacturing, a further increase in M2 is needed before
manufacturing additional new items becomes profitable. If M2 is just above the threshold where
manufacturing becomes profitable, then the number of manufactured items is small and hence
there is a capacity surplus (Region III). As M2 continues to increase, it becomes profitable to use
all available production capacity, and a capacity surplus changes into a shortage as more items
can be manufactured profitably than capacity allows. At first, the lost profit associated with a
capacity shortage in period 2 does not weigh up against the cost of building additional capacity
in period 1, and hence there is still a capacity match in that period (Region II). However, as M2
and with it the lost profit increases, it does become profitable at some point to have a capacity
surplus in period 1 (Region I).
Table 3.4 gives the global optimal solution for all regions. We remark that (see Appendix
3.A) cases 4-6 have the same solution and these are therefore included in Region III of this table.
Correspondingly, the optimality conditions for cases 4-6 in Table 3.3 can be combined into a
single optimality condition.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis
In Table 3.5, the results of the sensitivity analysis are presented. The details of the sensitivity
study are provided in Appendix 3.D. Note that these results are complete, but for a few cells
corresponding to case 2. For this case, we have not been able to prove what type of effect a
change in θ and τ has on the production quantities in period 2, most likely because those effects
have a more complex nature. In what follows, rather than present a repetitive discussion of all
individual effects, we discuss the most valuable insights.
We first discuss the effect of a change in the remanufacturing cost cr, which is obviously a key
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Region Cases Period 1 Period 2
















2n = (θ − τγ)q∗1n





III Cases 4-6 q∗1n =
M1−a1∆0
2
q∗2n = Ψ1 − γq∗1n


















Q∗ = q∗1n q
∗
2r = Ψ2
Table 3.4: Optimal solutions
parameter for the profitability of remanufacturing and for the optimal capacity and production
quantities. As expected, a decrease in cr always leads to more remanufacturing in period 2.
Unless there already is a surplus of returns (case 8), this requires more returns and hence an
increased production q∗1n in the first period. For some cases, the reduction in manufacturing in
period 2 is equal to the increase in remanufacturing, leaving the total production q∗2 in period
2 unchanged; for other cases total production increases. A particularly insightful result is that
the capacity Q∗ (in the first period) can either increase or decrease as a result of a reduction
in cr. To achieve the increased production in period 1 (so that more returns become available
in period 2), an increased capacity is needed for cases where there is no capacity surplus in
the first period. However, if a capacity surplus in the first period does exist and the increased
remanufacturing leads to a lower capacity requirement in period 2 (since remanufacturing is less
capacity intensive than manufacturing), then capacity can be reduced.
The effects of a change in the cost of manufacturing cn are straightforward. An increased
manufacturing cost leads to decreased production q∗1n and capacity Q∗ in the first period. Unless
there is a surplus of returns as well as capacity (case 8), remanufacturing q∗2r and total production
q∗2 in period 2 also decrease. For all cases, manufacturing q∗2n in period 2 is also non-increasing
45
in cn.
As expected, an increase in the cost of capacity co always leads to a reduced capacity Q
∗.
In most cases, the production q∗1n in period 1 also decreases with co as less capacity is available.
However, if there is a capacity surplus (case 1), then q∗1n increases to compensate for the capacity
shortage in period 2 (as this implies more returns and hence lower capacity needs in period 2).
The compensation is only partial, as the total production in period 2 q∗2 decreases for case 1.
For all other cases, q∗2 is also non-increasing in co.
A change in the relative capacity requirement for remanufacturing τ has little or no effect
in most cases. With the exception of case 2, the total production q∗2 in period 2 is not affected
by a change in τ . For most cases (3-8), this is explained by the fact that there is no shortage
of capacity in period 2 and hence no benefit from a (further) reduced capacity needed in that
period resulting from remanufacturing. For case 1, the reduced capacity need from a reduction
in τ is beneficial, but is used to reduce the capacity Q∗ in period 1 while keeping the total
production in period 2 unchanged. For case 2, the reduced capacity need is also beneficial and
indeed used to increase total production in period 2. For similar reasons, all policy parameters
are unchanged for all cases except the first two.
The effects of an increase in the relative length θ of the second period are very similar to
the just discussed effects of an increase in τ , as an increase in either parameter implies a higher
capacity requirement (per produced unit) per time unit. To avoid a repetition of arguments, we
instead refer to the above discussion on τ .
An increased return rate γ leads to higher availability of returns and increased remanufac-
turing in period 2, unless there is a surplus of returns (case 8). In some cases this also leads
to increased total production in period 2, but in other cases manufacturing is reduced by the
same amount by which remanufacturing increases. This is similar to the effect of a change in cr
discussed before, and the explanation why capacity Q∗ can either increase or decrease with γ is
along the same lines.
As expected, an increased market M1 in period 1 always leads to increased production q
∗
1n
in that period. For all cases except case 1, this corresponding increase in capacity requirement
also leads to increased capacity Q∗. For case 1 with a capacity surplus in period 1, Q∗ decreases
as more returns decrease the capacity requirement for period 2. The total production in period
46
2 either increases or is constant in M1. So, as for a change in before discussed parameters, we
see that an increase in the returns is sometimes used only to decrease cost as in cases 1 and
cases 4-6, and in other cases also to increase production.
An increase in the market size M2 for period 2 leads to increased total production for
that period. This increase in production can be achieved by lowering the capacity requirement
(through obtaining more returns) and/or by having more capacity available. This explains why
both q∗1n and Q∗ are non-decreasing in M2 for all cases.
The conducted sensitivity analysis also provides insights about the effect of remanufacturing
on the capacity investment, production quantity and retail prices. For cases 1 and 4-6 the
total production amount in period 2 does not change with remanufacturing parameters. That
means retail prices in those cases are the same if there is no remanufacturing option in the
second period. Thus, remanufacturing is used to reduce cost for cases 1 and 4-6, but not to
increase production. However, for case 2, total production in the second period increases with
the return rate. Consequently, retail prices with remanufacturing will be lower than that without
remanufacturing for case 2.
3.5 Optimal policy if remanufacturing is either more
costly or more capacity intensive
In this section, we relax the assumption that remanufacturing is both less expensive and less
capacity intensive. Obviously, remanufacturing is not beneficial when it is more costly and more
capacity intensive than only manufacturing. Thus, in this section we only consider the two
scenarios that remanufacturing is either more costly but less capacity intensive, or less costly
but more capacity intensive than manufacturing. For these two scenarios, we find the optimal
policy for period 2 in Appendix 3.B and numerically study in Section 3.6 the effects on period
1 decisions and on the profitability of remanufacturing.
Similar to the analysis of the main case in Section 3.3, we first consider the second period
problem and we obtain multiple regions with different optimality conditions with respect to first
period decision parameters, q1n and Q for both the cases where remanufacturing is either more
costly or more capacity intensive. The analysis can be found in Appendix 3.B and the results
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Region Case cr cn co τ θ γ M1 M2
I Case 1 Q∗ ↗ ↘(1) ↘ ↗ _ ↘ ↘ ↗
q∗1n ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗ ⊥
q∗2 ⊥ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ↗ ⊥ ⊥ ↗
q∗2n ↗ ↘(2) ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗
q∗2r ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗ ⊥
II Case 2 Q∗ ↘ ↘ ↘ _ _ _ ↗ ↗
q∗1n ↘ ↘ ↘ _ _ _ ↗ ↗
q∗2 ↘ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗
q∗2n ↘ ↘ ↘ _ ↗ ↗
q∗2r ↘ ↘ ↘ _ ↗ ↗ ↗
III Case 4-6 Q∗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ⊥
q∗1n ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ⊥
q∗2 ⊥ ↘(2) ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ↗
q∗2n ↗ ↘ ↗ ⊥ ⊥ ↘ ↘ ↗
q∗2r ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ⊥
IV Case 7 Q∗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ _ ↗ ↗
q∗1n ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ _ ↗ ↗
q∗2 ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ↗
q∗2n ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
q∗2r ↘ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ↗ ↗
V Case 8 Q∗ ⊥ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ⊥
q∗1n ⊥ ↘ ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ↗ ⊥
q∗2 ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ↗
q∗2n ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
q∗2r ↘ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ↗
Table 3.5: Impact of parameters on optimal solution (↗: increasing, ↘: decreasing, _ :
quasiconcave, ⊥ : constant ) (True for c(1)n if a2 > a1γ(1− βγ)(1− τ) holds, true for c(2)n if












Figure 3.2: Optimality regions for the second period problem with respect to first period
decisions when cn < cr
are presented graphically and discussed here.
We start with the scenario where remanufacturing is more costly but less capacity intensive.
The optimality regions are depicted in Figure 3.2. In Region 1, it is optimal to both manufacture
and remanufacture in the second period. Moreover, although remanufacturing is more expensive
than manufacturing, it is optimal to remanufacture all available cores since there is insufficient
capacity in the second period. In Region 2, it is also optimal to do both remanufacturing and
manufacturing in the second period. However, there are more cores available and not all are
remanufactured. In Regions 3 and 4, remanufacturing is not beneficial anymore.
Next, we consider the scenario that remanufacturing is less costly, but more capacity inten-
sive. The optimality regions are depicted in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 for the cases in which the
conditions Ψ1/Ψ0 > τ > 1 and τ > Ψ1/Ψ0 > 1 hold respectively.
In Region 1, capacity is restricted and so it is not beneficial to remanufacture in the second
period. In Region 2, the available capacity is sufficient to profitably remanufacture part but
not all of the returns. In Region 3, capacity is high enough to make remanufacturing of all















Figure 3.3: Optimality regions for the second period problem with respect to first period
















Figure 3.4: Optimality regions for the second period problem with respect to first period
decisions when τ > Ψ1/Ψ0 > 1 and cn > cr
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where remanufacturing is restricted by the number of the available cores. In Region 5, capacity
and cores availability are sufficient to fully replace manufacturing by remanufacturing; and in
Region 6, it is not these availabilities but market conditions that are most restrictive for the
production.
To summarize, for both scenarios there are parameter combinations (regions) where reman-
ufacturing is applied and sometimes even “fully” replaces manufacturing, but this is not always
the case.
3.6 Numerical analysis: Sensitivity and profitability
for different scenarios
In the previous section, we consider different scenarios regarding to remanufacturing conditions
and define the optimal production policy for a given capacity and production amount in the
first period. The objective of this section is to obtain insights into the profitability of reman-
ufacturing and its effects on capacity and production decisions across the different scenarios.
Obviously, remanufacturing is most beneficial if remanufacturing is both less costly and less
capacity intensive than manufacturing, but how much is lost if this is not the case? To answer
this question, we perform an extensive numerical investigation where we separately consider the
three relevant scenarios analyzed in previous sections and vary all relevant parameters, except
for the discount factor that we fix at β = 0.8. For each scenario we consider a full factorial de-
sign with 59,049 different configurations for every possible combination of the parameter values
presented in Table 3.6.
The numerical results are summarized in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. Note that the regions are
different for each scenario, as discussed in previous sections, and so results per region should
not be compared across scenarios.
The first important result is that the relative profit gain is much smaller for the scenario
where remanufacturing is more costly but less capacity intensive. Indeed, for this scenario, none
of the regions show an average gain of more than 1%, and the average gain across all cases (in
all regions, weighted for the number of cases in a region) is only 0.04%. On the other hand, the




M1 10 55 100
M2 10 55 100
a1 0.1 0.6 1.1
a2 0.1 0.6 1.1
co 0.1 2.5 4.9
γ 0.1 0.5 0.9
Remanufacturing less costly, less capacity intensive
cn cr + 0.1 cr + 2.1 cr + 4.1
cr 0.1 2.5 4.9
τ 0.01 0.41 0.81
θ 1 2 3
Remanufacturing more costly, less capacity intensive
cn 0.1 2.5 4.9
cr cn + 0.1 cn + 2.1 cn + 4.1
τ 0.01 0.41 0.81
θ 1 2 3
Remanufacturing less costly, more capacity intensive
cn cr + 0.1 cr + 2.1 cr + 4.1
cr 0.1 2.5 4.9
τ 1.01 2.01 3.01
θ 2.8 3.8 4.8
Table 3.6: Parameters for numerical study
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Region1 Region2 Region3 Region4 Region5
Percentage of cases 25.07 2.62 49.86 3.35 19.10
Average percentage profit gain 1.22 8.15 1.02 7.04 0.45
Average cn − cr 2.12 2.08 2.05 2.82 2.07
Average τ 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41
Average increase in capacity −1.43 −1.49 −0.27 0.12 0
Table 3.7: Results if remanufacturing is less costly and less capacity intensive.
Region1 Region2 Region3 Region4
Percentage of cases 8.76 2.87 24.79 63.55
Average percentage profit gain 0.45 0.14 0 0
Average cr − cn 0.63 0.64 2. 75 2. 11
Average τ 0.33 0.21 0.45 0.41
Average increase in capacity −2.07 −2.24 0 0
Table 3.8: Results if remanufacturing is more costly and less capacity intensive.
Region1 Region2 Region3 Region4 Region5 Region6
Percentage of cases 6.88 2.17 17.17 50.27 2.85 21.72
Average percentage profit gain 0 0.25 0.70 1.04 7.52 0.45
Average cn − cr 0.68 1.24 2.74 2.04 3.18 2.07
Average τ 2.63 2.86 1.82 1.98 2.01 2.01
Avg Increase in capacity 0 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.12 0
Table 3.9: Results if remanufacturing is less costly and more capacity intensive.
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larger gain of 0.96% across all cases. Moreover, there is one region (numbered 5) with an
average gain of more than 7%. Recall from Section 3.5 that this is the region where capacity
in the second period is not a restricting factor, and so the increased capacity usage is not a
disadvantage. Moreover, there is no manufacturing in period 2 and so the relative production
cost savings are maximal by completely switching to remanufacturing. Also, and different from
region 6, the market in period 2 is of sufficient size to remanufacture all the returns. Thus, we
can state that remanufacturing can provide additional benefits even if it is either more costly
or more capacity intensive than manufacturing but the additional benefit of remanufacturing
is more pronounced when it is more capacity intensive but less costly, especially when there is
sufficient capacity in the latter stage of the life-cycle.
For the scenario where remanufacturing offers benefits in terms lower cost and lower capac-
ity usage, this same situation (capacity is not restrictive, all returns are remanufactured and no
additional items are manufactured in period 2), now denoted as Region 4, also shows a consid-
erable percentage gain of over 7% on average. A gain of similar size is observed for region 2. In
this region, there is a capacity shortage in period 2 and so the decreased capacity usage from
remanufacturing offers an additional advantage. The same holds for region 1, but that has a
smaller market size and therefore fewer returns. The average gain across all cases is 1.35%.
3.7 Conclusions
Remanufacturing operations typically differ from manufacturing operations in both cost and
capacity usage. In this chapter, we analyze their combined effects on production and capacity
decisions and on the profitability of remanufacturing. The analysis is done for a two-period
model with capacity and manufacturing decisions in the first period and manufacturing and re-
manufacturing decisions in the second period. We first consider the most preferred and realistic
scenario where remanufacturing is less costly and less capacity intensive than manufacturing.
Closed-form solutions are derived for all capacity and production decisions and used to conduct
a sensitivity analysis. This revealed that in some cases, remanufacturing only replaces manu-
facturing to reduce cost leaving the total production in the second period unchanged. However,
for other cases, remanufacturing does increase the total production quantity. A particularly
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interesting finding is that the availability of the less capital intensive remanufacturing option
sometimes leads to an increased capital investment. In such cases, the additional investment
is made to increase production in period 1 and thereby the number of returns in period 2. In
other cases, with surplus capacity in the first period, introducing the remanufacturing option
does lead to a reduction in the capacity investment.
We then relax the assumption that remanufacturing is less expensive and requires less capac-
ity than manufacturing, and conduct a numerical study for the scenarios where remanufacturing
is either less costly or less capacity intensive than manufacturing. It turned out that the scenario
where remanufacturing is more costly is by far the least beneficial. Remanufacturing can retain
considerable benefits if it is more capacity intensive, but only if the cost and market conditions
are such that there is sufficient capacity in the latter stage of the life-cycle (period 2).
We conclude by pointing out three future research directions related to the limiting assump-
tions in our model. First of all, by relaxing the assumption of fixed return rate, we may consider
a stochastic return rate due to the market uncertainty. Moreover, competition for collecting
cores and or selling (re)manufactured products can be considered. Doing so would obviously
require the inclusion of other players, such as collectors and/or OEMs. Furthermore, more than
two-periods would allow a more accurate description of a product life-cycle.
Appendix 3.A. Optimality analysis for all eight cases
In this appendix, we determine the optimal values of q1n and Q for all eight cases that are
identified in Section 3.3 and described in Table 3.2. From that table, it is clear that the total
production in period 2 is (1 − τ)γq1n + θQ for cases 1 and 2, Ψ1 for cases 3-6, γq1n for case 7
and Ψ2 for case 8. So Π
∗
2(q1n, Q) can be rewritten as in Table 3.10 for different cases.
Using these results, (2) can be rewritten in terms of q1n and Q for each case, after which
the first order conditions can be derived to find the optimal solution. This is straightforward
and the solutions are given in Table 3.4. We remark that the solutions for the different cases in
Table 3.4 do not necessarily satisfy the case-dependent restrictions as listed in Table 3.3. Our
next step is therefore to combine those restrictions into a single feasibility constraint for each
separate case.
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Case 1: From Table 3.2 we get
q1n < Q,
(1− τ)γq1n + θQ < Ψ1,
γq1n < Ψ1.
Note that if (1 − τ)γq1n + θQ < Ψ1, we have γq1n < Ψ1 since θ > τγ. So we only need to
consider the first two inequalities. Substituting the optimal solution from Table 3.4 we have
[θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2co/(βθ) < M2 − a2cn, (3.3)
(M2 − a2cn)/2− a2co/(βθ) < (M2 − a2cn)/2. (3.4)
Since the second inequality is clearly true, we conclude that this solution is feasible if (3.3) holds.
Case 2: From Table 3.2 we get
(1− τ)γq1n + θQ < Ψ1,
γq1n < Ψ1.
Similar to Case 1, we only need to consider the first inequality. Substituting the optimal solution
from Table 3.4 we have
M2 − a2cn
2
> [(1− τ)γ + θ]{M1/a1 − cn − co + βγ(cn − cr) + β[(1− τ)γ + θ]
×(M2/a2 − cn)}{2/a1 + 2β[(1− τ)γ + θ]2/a2}−1,
which simplifies to M2 − a2cn > [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0).
Case 3: From Table 3.2 we get q1n < Q. Note that γq1n < Ψ1 since (1− τ)γq1n + θQ = Ψ1.
Substituting the optimal solution from Table 3.4 we have
M2 − a2cn > [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1).
Case 4: We get M2 − a2cn ≥ 0.
Case 5: From Table 3.2 we get γq1n < Ψ1 < (1 − τ)γq1n + θQ. Substituting the optimal
solution from Table 3.4 have
γ(M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn < [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0).
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Case 6: It is obvious from Table 3.2 that γq1n = Ψ1. Substituting the optimal solution
from Table 3.4 gives γ(M1 − a1∆0) = M2 − a2cn.
Case 7: From Table 3.2 we get γq∗1n > Ψ1. Substituting the optimal solution from Table 4
gives








which simplifies to γ(M1 − a1∆0) > M2 − a2cn.
Case 8: From Table 3.2 we get γq∗1n > Ψ2. Substituting the optimal solution from Table 4
we have
γ






which yields M2 − a2cr < γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)].
Table 3.11 lists the feasibility constraints for all eight cases. Obviously, a certain case can only
be optimal if it is feasible, i.e. the feasibility constraint in Table 3.11 is a necessary condition for
optimality. However, it is not a sufficiency condition and, for some cases, we can derive further
optimality constraints. This is done in the Appendix 3.A.1.
Appendix 3.A.1 Optimality conditions
From the case descriptions in Table 3.2 we see that case 2 is on the limit of case 1 in the
following sense: case 1 considers all solutions with a positive (but possibly very small) surplus
in the first period, whereas case 2 considers solution with a capacity match, i.e., zero surplus,
in period 1. Note that we use the term limit rather than boundary, as we already use the latter
term (in the main text) to describe (graphically - for M1 versus M2) neighboring regions. As
case 2 is on the limit of case 1 and because the profit expression is continuous in all production
quantities, the following must hold: if the optimal solution of case 1 is feasible, then it must have
a higher profit than any solution of case 2. From the feasibility condition for case 1 in Table
3.11, we therefore get the following additional optimality condition for case 2: M2 − a2cn ≤
[θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ .
Similarly, case 4 is on the limit of both cases 3 and 5, which leads to the following additional



















































lr + (cn − cr)lr
Table 3.10: Π∗2(q1n, Q) for all cases.
Case Feasibility constraint
1 M2 − a2cn > [θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ
2 [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn
3 M2 − a2cn > [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1)
4 M2 − a2cn ≥ 0
5 γ(M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn < [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0)
6 M2 − a2cn = γ(M1 − a1∆0)
7 M2 − a2cn < γ(M1 − a1∆0)
8 M2 − a2cr > γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)]
Table 3.11: Feasibility of local optimal solutions for all cases.
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Case Feasibility constraint
1 M2 − a2cn > [θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ
2 [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn ≤ [θ + (1− τ)γ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2coβθ
3 M2 − a2cn > [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1)
4 [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0) ≤M2 − a2cn ≤ [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1)
5 γ(M1 − a1∆0) < M2 − a2cn < [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0)
6 M2 − a2cn = γ(M1 − a1∆0)
7 M2 − a2cn < γ(M1 − a1∆0), M2 − a2cr ≥ γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)
8 M2 − a2cr < γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)
Table 3.12: Restricted feasibility of optimal values for all cases.
By combining these additional conditions for cases 2 and 4 with the feasibility condition in
Table 3.11, a stricter optimality condition is obtained. These are given in Table 3.12.
Appendix 3.A.2 Global optimal solution
Based on the optimality conditions in Table 3.12 we construct Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 depicts
local optimal solutions for regions defined with boundaries L1, L2, L3, L4, are given by
M2 − a2cn = [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2co
βθ
,
M2 − a2cn = [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1),
M2 − a2cn = [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆0),
M2 − a2cn = γ(M1 − a1∆0),
M2 − a2cr = γ(M1 − a1(cn + co)).
What remains is to show for Regions I and II, which of the two candidates is indeed globally
optimal. This is done next for each region separately. From (3.2) we determine the profit
functions for all cases using Table 3.4 and list them in Table 3.13. We use superscript i to
















































Table 3.13: Profit functions of the 8 Cases
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From Table 3.13 we can easily get






The optimality condition for this region is
[(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1) < M2 − a2cn ≤ [(1− τ)γ + θ](M1 − a1∆1) + a2co
βθ
. (3.5)
Let us define M2 − a2cn by x, (1− τ)γ + θ by A, and define f(x) = Π2 −Π3. Then, from Table
3.13, we have
















which clearly is strictly concave in x.
Differentiating f(x) with respect to x, we have



























By (3.5), we have that f ′(x) is non-negative.
Since A = (1− τ)γ+ θ, we have ∆0 = ∆1 + coA/θ. Further denoting y = M1− a1∆1, we get


















Thus, we have Π2 > Π3 in this region.
Region II


































Thus, case 2 is always better than case 4 in Region III.
Appendix 3.B. Optimality analysis when remanufac-
turing is either more costly or more capacity intensive
In this appendix we relax the assumption that remanufacturing is both less expensive and re-
quires less capacity than manufacturing and consider two different scenarios. At first we look
at the scenario in which remanufacturing is less costly but more capacity intensive than manu-
facturing, and later we investigate the conditions where remanufacturing requires less capacity






− cn)q2 − (cn − cr)q2r + λ1[q2 − (1− τ)q2r − θQ] + λ2(q2r − γq1n)}, (3.6)
where λ1 and λ2 are non-negative and Lagrangian multipliers.
The first-order and complementary slackness conditions are given by
−M2 − a2cn − 2q2
a2
+ λ1 = 0, (3.7)
−(cn − cr)− λ1(1− τ) + λ2 = 0, (3.8)
λ1[q2 − (1− τ)q2r − θQ] = 0, (3.9)
λ2(q2r − γq1n) = 0. (3.10)
Appendix 3.B.1: Remanufacturing more costly
At first, we look at the scenario when remanufacturing is more costly than manufacturing i.e.
cr > cn. First of all observe that λ1 = 0 cannot be zero since (3.8) would otherwise give λ2 < 0
which cannot hold since both λ1 and λ2 have to be non-negative. Thus, we only consider two
cases; λ2 = 0 and λ2 > 0.
Case 1: λ2 = 0.
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From (3.8) we have
λ1 =
cr − cn
1− τ > 0. (3.11)
By substituting (3.11) into (3.7), we obtain
q2 =





− a2(cr − cn)
2(1− τ) . (3.12)





2(1− τ) [M2 − a2cn −
a2(cr − cn)
1− τ − 2θQ]. (3.13)
Note that the number of remanufactured products has to be nonnegative and restricted by the
amount of available cores. In other words 0 ≤ q2r ≤ γq1n must hold, which gives two inequalities,
(3.14) and (3.15). Additionally, non-negativity of q2n provides one more inequality (3.16).
θQ−Ψ0 ≤ 0, (3.14)
Ψ0 − θQ− (1− τ)γq1n ≤ 0, (3.15)
τΨ0 − θQ ≤ 0. (3.16)
If (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) all hold then the optimal solution satisfies (3.12) and (3.13),
which gives q∗2 = Ψ0, q∗2r = (Ψ0 − θQ)/(1− τ), and q∗2n = (θQ− τΨ0)/(1− τ).
If (3.14) does not hold then q∗2r = 0 and conditions (3.15) and (3.16) automatically hold. If
Ψ1 ≤ θQ then q∗2n = Ψ1; otherwise, if Ψ0 ≤ θQ ≤ Ψ1 then q∗2n = θQ.
If (3.14) and (3.15) hold but (3.16) does not hold, then q∗2n = 0. Hence q2 = q2r so that
(3.9) gives q∗2r = θQ/τ . Since we assume that (3.15) holds, γq1n > q∗2r = θQ/τ will always hold.
Note that we also consider the capacity constraint for the first period, i.e., q1n ≤ Q, and for the
entire analysis we assume γτ ≤ θ. These two inequalities contradict with γq1n > θQ/τ. Thus,
the case q∗2n = 0 and q∗2r = θQ/τ is never optimal.
If we consider q2n = 0 in (3.6) when (3.14) and (3.15) hold but (3.16) does not hold, we will
obtain q2r = Ψ2. The capacity constraint in the second period implies that τΨ2 ≤ θQ must hold.
Since τΨ0 < τΨ2 holds, this contradicts with our assumption that θQ < τΨ0. Thus, q2r = Ψ2
is never optimal.
Case 2: λ2 > 0.
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By (3.10) we have q2r = γq1n. If we substitute this into (3.9) we obtain q2 = (1−τ)q2r+θQ =
(1 − τ)γq1n + θQ. By (3.8) we have λ1 = (cr − cn + λ2)/(1 − τ) > 0.. By (3.7), we have
λ1 = M2 − a2cn − 2[(1− τ)γq1n + θQ]/a2 and λ2 = λ1 − (cr − cn)/(1− τ).
Note that we need to check for the non-negativity conditions for λ1 and λ2. From the
non-negativity conditions, we obtain the following two inequalities,
Ψ1 > (1− τ)γq1n + θQ, (3.17)
Ψ0 > (1− τ)γq1n + θQ. (3.18)
Condition (3.17) always holds since Ψ1 > Ψ0. Thus, when (3.18) holds the optimal solution
is given by q∗2 = (1− τ)γq1n + θQ, q∗2r = γq1n, and q∗2n = θQ− τγq1n.
Appendix 3.B.2: Remanufacturing more capacity intensive
From (3.8) it is clear that the case λ1 = λ2 = 0 cannot hold since we assume that cn > cr holds.
Thus, we have to consider three other cases. The first occurs when λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, the
second case where λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 and finally we analyze the case when λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0.
Case 1: λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0.
By (3.8) we have
λ1 =
cn − cr
τ − 1 > 0. (3.19)




− a2(cn − cr)
2(τ − 1) . (3.20)
And by substituting (3.20) into (3.9), we have
q∗2r =
θQ− M2−a2cn2 − a2(cn−cr)2(τ−1)
τ − 1 =
θQ−Ψ0
(τ − 1) . (3.21)
Note that the number of remanufactured products has to be nonnegative and is restricted by
the amount of available cores. In other words 0 ≤ q2r ≤ γq1n must hold which gives inequalities
(3.22) and (3.23). Additionally, non-negativity of q2n provides inequality (3.24).
θQ−Ψ0 ≥ 0, (3.22)
θQ−Ψ0 ≤ (τ − 1)γq1n, (3.23)
τΨ0 − θQ ≥ 0. (3.24)
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If (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) all hold, then, the optimal solution satisfies (3.20) and (3.21)
which can be rewritten as q∗2 = Ψ0, q∗2r = (θQ−Ψ0)/(τ − 1), and q∗2n = (τΨ0 − θQ)/(τ − 1).
If (3.22) does not hold, then (3.23) and (3.24) must hold so that q∗2r = 0 and q∗2n = θQ.
Case 2 :λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0.
By (3.10) we have q∗2r = γq1n and (3.8) gives λ2 = cn − cr > 0. By (3.7) we have q2 = Ψ1
and q2n = Ψ1 − γq1n.
This is the optimal solution for the second period problem for given q1n and Q value if the
following inequalities hold.
Ψ1 ≥ γq1n, (3.25)
(τ − 1)γq1n + Ψ1 ≤ θQ. (3.26)
If (3.25) does not hold, i.e when Ψ2 ≥ γq1n ≥ Ψ1, then q∗2n = 0 and q∗2r = γq1n is the optimal
solution assuring that τγq1n ≤ θQ also holds.
Also, if we consider (3.6) when q∗2n = 0 under the condition that (3.25) does not hold, the
optimal solution will be q∗2r = Ψ2, when γq1n ≥ Ψ2 and θQ ≥ τΨ2 hold.
Case 3 :λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0.
By (3.9) and (3.10) we have q∗2 = θQ− (τ − 1)γq1n, q∗2r = γq1n, and q∗2n = θQ− τγq1n.
To ensure that λ1 and λ2 are positive, Ψ0 ≤ θQ− (τ − 1)γq1n ≤ Ψ1 must hold.
Appendix 3.C. Optimal solution in the region (M1,M2 ≥
0)
In the main text, we restrict our attention to the situation where M1 ≥ a1∆0 and M2 ≥ a2cn.
Now we relax these two assumptions and present the global optimal solution in the whole region
(M1,M2 ≥ 0). Since the analysis depends on whether or not ∆1 ≥ 0, we first assume ∆1 ≥ 0
and later address the situation that ∆1 < 0. Figure 3.6 shows the global optimal solutions with
8 regions. The detailed reasoning is given below.
Region I
By Table 3.4, we note that q∗1n in Region I is non-negative as long as M1 ≥ a1∆1. So, we










































a1 (cn  + co ) M1 
Figure 3.6: The global optimal solution for ∆1 ≥ 0.
Region II
By Table 3.4, we note that the optimal q∗1n in Region II still applies as long as
M1 − a1∆0
a1
+ β[(1− τ)γ + θ]M2 − a2cn
a2
≥ 0.
So, we can extend Region II till the boundary by L7, where L7 is given by
M1 − a1∆0
a1
+ β[(1− τ)γ + θ]M2 − a2cn
a2
= 0.
Further, by the optimality condition of case 2, we have q∗1n ≤ M1−a1∆12 . Since q∗1n ≥ 0, we also
have to require that M1 ≥ a1∆1, as for Region I.
Region III
Region III remains the same since it requires M1 ≥ a1∆0 and M2 ≥ a2cn.
Region IV
By Table 3.4, we note that q∗1n in Region IV is still true as long as






So, we can extend Region V till the boundary by L6, where L6 is given by








By Table 3.4, we can extend Region V till M1 = a1(cn + co) and M2 = a2cr.
Region VI
We intend to show that in Region VI, the firm only produces in period 1. The reasoning is
as follows. In period 2, it is clear that the maximal price is M2/a2. If M2/a2 ≤ cr, the firm does
not have any incentive to perform production in period 2. Under this situation, the firm may
only produce in period 1. Then, we can rewrite (3.2) as follows,
Π1(q1n, Q) = (p1 − cn)q1n − coQ. (3.27)






Since q∗1n ≥ 0 when M1 ≥ a1(cn + co), the optimal solution is feasible. So, in Region VI, the
firm only produces in period 1.
Region VII
We intend to show that in Region VII, the firm only produces in period 2. The corresponding
profit function is given by
Π1(q2n, Q) = β(p2 − cn)q2n − coQ. (3.28)





and Q∗ = q∗2n/θ. Since q∗1n ≥ 0, when M2 ≥ a2(cn + co) + a2co/(βθ), the optimal solution is
feasible. So, in Region VII, the firm only produces in period 2.
Region VIII
Finally, in Region VIII, since neither M1 nor M2 is large enough, the firm produces in neither
period.
Now we discuss how these results change if ∆1 < 0. Figure 3.7 shows a scenario where the
intercept of L1 is less than that of L7, i.e.,
a2co
βθ
− a1∆1[(1− τ)γ + θ] < a1∆0
β[(1− τ)γ + θ] .
Compared with Figure 3.6, the main difference is that Region VII disappears since ∆1 < 0 (as
the unit capacity cost saving (co(1−τ)γ/θ) outweighs the unit production cost (cn−βγ(cn−cr)) in
period 1), which indicates that it is always profitable to produce in period 1. Also, the intercept
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a1 (cn  + co ) M1 
Figure 3.7: The global optimal solution for ∆1 < 0.
Appendix 3.D. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we analyze the effect of parameters on the optimal solution.




















































































Thus, as cr increases, q
∗
1n, Q


























Thus, as cr increases, Q






















Thus, as cr increases, q
∗
1n, Q










So Q, q∗1n, q∗2n are constant with respect to cr,and q∗2r decreases. with cr.



















































Thus, q∗1n, q∗2r, q∗2 decrease in cr. If a2 > a1(1−βγ) (1− τ) γ, then Q∗ decreases in cn; otherwise,








β(τγ − θ)− 1


























































∗ all decrease. If a2 > a1(1 − βγ)γ, then q∗2n decreases
in cn; otherwise, q
∗







































Thus, as cn increases, q
∗
1n and Q
∗ decrease and q∗2n, q∗2r, q∗2 is constant with respect to cn.
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Thus, q∗1n and Q∗ decrease in co and q∗2r, q∗2n, q∗2 is constant with respect to co.
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where S = ((1− τ)γ + θ), I = M2 − a2cn, K = M1 − a1∆0. Since the denominator of ∂q∗1n/∂τ
is always positive, the sign of ∂q∗1n/∂τ is same as that of the numerator, which is a quadratic


















The upper and lower bounds for S namely Su and Sl, can be derived from the optimality
condition for case 2, which is SK < I ≤ SK+ coβθ (S2a1β+a2). Thus, if S satisfies the condition
Sl ≤ S ≤ S′, then q∗1n, q∗2r and Q∗ increase in τ ; and if S satisfies the condition S′ ≤ S ≤ Su,then
q∗1n, q∗2r and Q∗ decrease in τ . Next, we continue with the sensitivity analysis for period 2.
∂q∗2n
∂τ












However, due to the complexity of these expressions, we have not been able to derive closed
form expressions for their roots which are third degree polynomials for τ . Besides finding roots,
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it should also be checked whether they are non-negative and satisfy the optimality condition for
case 2, which is also non-trivial.
Cases 4-8
All decision variables are constant in τ .







Thus, q1n decreases in θ.
∂Q∗
∂θ






(1− τ)γ(M1 − a1(cn − βγ(cn − cr))) + 2(1− τ)2γ2a1co
2θ3
=
2a2co + β(1− τ)γ(M1 − a1(cn − βγ(cn − cr))) + 2(1− τ)2γ2a1co − βθ(M2 − a2cn)
2βθ3
.
Let θ′ = 2a2co + β(1− τ)γ(M1 − a1(cn − βγ(cn − cr))) + 2(1− τ)2γ2a1co/[β(M2 − a2cn)]
since 2βθ3 > 0 always holds ∂Q∂θ < 0 if θ < θ



























































Let I = (M2−a2cn), K = (M1−a1∆0) and S = [(1− τ)γ+ θ]. The denominator of ∂Q∗/∂θ
is always positive, and hence the sign of ∂Q∗/∂θ is same as that of the numerator which is a
quadratic equation with respect to S. Let N = 2βIa2 −
2β2S2I
a22













The upper and lower bounds for S namely Su and Sl, can be derived from the optimality
condition for case 2, which is SK < I ≤ SK+ coβθ (S2a1β+a2). Thus, if S satisfies the condition
Sl ≤ S ≤ S′, then q∗1n, q∗2r and Q∗ decrease in θ;and if S satisfies the condition S′ ≤ S ≤ Su,
then q∗1n, q∗2r and Q∗ increase in θ. Next, we continue with the sensitivity analysis for period 2
∂q∗2n
∂θ












As in sensitivity analysis with respect to τ in case 2, these expressions are very complex
and we have not been able to find the roots that are non-negative and satisfy the optimality
condition for this case.
Case 4-8 The optimal solution does not depend on θ.














































+ (1− τ)q∗1n + (1− τ)γ
∂q∗1n
∂γ
= −(1− τ)q∗1n − (1− τ)γ
∂q∗1n
∂γ












{[β(cn − cr) + β(1− τ)M2−a2cna2 ][1/a1 + β[(1− τ)γ + θ]2/a2]
−2(1− τ)β[(1−τ)γ+θ]a2 [M1−a1∆0a1 + β((1− τ)γ + θ)M2−a2cna2 ]}
2(1/a1 + β((1− τ)γ + θ)2/a2)2 ,
∂q∗2n
∂γ






Since the denominator of ∂q∗1n/∂γ is always positive the sign of ∂q∗1n/∂γ is same as the
numerator that is a quadratic equation with respect to γ.
Denote K = M1 − a1∆0, S = [θ + (1− τ)γ] , I = M2 − a2cn. Then,
∂q∗2r
∂γ


































2(1/a1 + β((1− τ)γ + θ)2/a2)2 ,
∂q∗2
∂γ










































2(1/a1 + β((1− τ)γ + θ)2/a2)2 > 0.










β(cn − cr) > 0,
∂q∗2r
∂γ


































Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of the above expression is equal to that of the





, A = −β(M2−a2cr)
a22
, B = −2β(M1−a1(cn+co)a1a2 , C =
β(M2−a2cr)
a1a2
. Since γ is non-negative
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β(M2 − a2cr) .
Moreover, we can determine the upper and lower limits for γ namely, γu and γl from the
optimality condition of case 2 that is presented in Table 3. To find γl we have to consider the
optimality condition M2−a2cn < γ(M1−a1∆0), which can be rewritten as a quadratic equation
in γ. Since γ is non-negative, the only root of the equation is
γl =
√
[M1 − a1(cn + co)]2 + 4βa1(cn − cr)(M2 − a2cn)− [M1 − a1(cn + co)]
2βa1(cn − cr) .




M1 − a1(cn + co) .

















since M2 − a2cr ≥ γ[M1 − a1(cn + co)] holds. Thus, q∗2r and q∗2 increase in γ.
Case 8
The optimal solution does not depend on γ.










































































Thus, as M1 increases, q
∗
1n, Q


































Thus, as M1 increases, q
∗
1n, Q






















Thus, as M1 increases, q
∗
1n, Q











Thus, as M1 increases, Q
∗ and q∗1n increase and q∗2n, q∗2r, q∗2 do not change.





























Thus, as M2 increases, Q









β[(1− τ)γ + θ]

















































































Thus, as M2 increases, q
∗
1n, Q
























2 increase and q
∗
1n, Q
∗ do not change.
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Chapter 4
Competition for cores in
remanufacturing
This chapter is published as Caner, Zhu, and Teunter (2013), Competition for Cores in Reman-
ufacturing, European Journal of Operations Research.DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.08.025.
In this chapter, we study competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
and an independently operating remanufacturer (IO). Different from the existing literature, the
OEM and IO compete not only for selling their products but also for collecting returned products
(cores) through their acquisition prices. We consider a two-period model with manufacturing by
the OEM in the first period, and manufacturing as well as remanufacturing in the second period.
We find the optimal policies for both players by establishing a Nash Equilibrium in the second
period, and then determine the optimal manufacturing decision for the OEM in the first period.
This leads to a number of managerial insights. One interesting result is that the acquisition
price of the OEM only depends on its own cost structure, and not on the acquisition price of the
IO. Further insights are obtained from a numerical investigation. We find that when the cost
benefits of remanufacturing diminishes and the IO has more chance to collect the available cores,
the OEM manufactures less in the first period as the market in the second period gets larger to
protect its market share. Finally, we consider the case where consumers have lower willingness




The importance of sustainable and environmental processes has increased over the last fifty
years, as industrialization and population growth have increasingly burdened the environment.
To reduce this burden, European companies have been made legally responsible for collecting
their end-of-life products and adopting the sustainable production strategy of product recovery
(recycling and remanufacturing). In other countries where firms are not legally bound to collect
used-products, many still do so because of the economic benefits (Kaya, 2010).
Remanufacturing is defined as the process of bringing used products to a like-new functional
state with warranty to match. The steps of a remanufacturing process are: collecting the
used/discarded items, disassembling those items into their parts, cleaning and inspecting each
part, and finally reassembling the parts and testing the remanufactured products to function as
if they were new.
Remanufacturing has numerous benefits for the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
These include savings in labor, material and energy costs; shorter production lead times; bal-
anced production lines; new market development opportunities, and a positive, socially con-
cerned image (McConocha and Speh, 1991). Adopting remanufacturing as a part of production
strategy allowed Caterpillar to create a new market among contractors who cannot afford to
purchase a Caterpillar product outright (Gutowski et al., 2001). In the 2008/2009 financial
year, Fuji Xerox Australia remanufactured more than 230,000 equipment parts, equating to a
$6 million cost-saving compared to sourcing new parts (www.fujixerox.com).
There is also an encouraging market for remanufactured products in the US. According to
U.S International Trade Commission, production of remanufactured products in U.S increased
from $37.3 billion in 2009 to $43.0 billion in 2011 (www.usitc.gov).
Despite of the numerous benefits, many firms have reservations about adopting a remanu-
facturing strategy related to concerns about internal cannibalization and external competition.
Starting with the first, when consumer populations for new and remanufactured products over-
lap, selling remanufactured products may reduce new product sales (even if different marketing
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channels are used). Firms may consider this situation undesirable as it can cut revenues, even if
the profit margin of a new product is less than that of a remanufactured product. Internal can-
nibalization is not a concern for an OEM if new and remanufactured products are perceived as
the same to customers (Atasu et al., 2010), such as refillable containers and single-use cameras.
Also, in Japan Fuji Xerox incorporated reused components in new products. Thus, all products
may include reused components and there is no distinction between new and remanufactured
products (Matsumoto and Umeda, 2011).
External competition is the other major issue for firms. If an OEM does not offer a re-
manufactured version of a popular product (because of cannibalization concerns), independent
operators (IOs) may enter the market and compete for returns and a share of the market. In
this case, the OEM faces external competition rather than internal cannibalization, or both
if the OEM itself also remanufactures products. Guide (2000) estimates that 95% of the re-
manufacturing programs are not managed by the original producers. In the mobile phone and
automobile parts remanufacturing industry, for instance, independent operators have a clear
dominance. Kodak also competes with IOs today to collect and remanufacture the single-used
cameras. Moreover, as Atasu et al. (2010) state, it is very difficult for OEMs to enter the
remanufacturing market after it becomes dominated by IOs. Thus, remanufacturing decisions
and the positioning (pricing) of remanufactured products are crucial for OEMs. However, there
is a lack of analytical tools for guiding firms in those decisions. As Ferguson and Toktay (2006)
and Atasu et al. (2008) state, most of the firms today do not have a clear understanding of how
to adopt remanufacturing and position a remanufactured product.
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of competition between one OEM and one IO on the
optimal production and pricing strategies. Our aim is to find the optimal strategies for the agents
in the case of competition and to determine the effect of competition on the remanufacturing
strategy. We determine the optimal manufacturing and remanufacturing decisions for an OEM
and an IO in a two-period setting.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section reviews the closely related
literature and explains our contribution. Section 4.3 describes the model in detail and in Section
4.4 we characterize the optimal policy for periods 2 and 1. A numerical study is conducted in
Section 4.5 to understand the effect of each parameter on the optimal solution and to gain
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insights into the effect of remanufacturing on the total production in both periods and on the
OEM’s profit. In Section 4.6, we consider the case where new and remanufactured products are
sold at different prices and conduct a numerical study similar to that in Section 4.5 to understand
how different selling price for products change the effect of parameters on the optimal solution.
Finally, in Section 4.7, a brief summary of the findings and managerial insights is provided, and
avenues for further research are discussed.
4.2 Closely related literature
In this section, we review the literature and point out key differences with our study.
There are numerous studies on closed-loop supply chains and remanufacturing in the current
literature. Fleischmann et al. (1997) provide a review for early studies and Guide and Van
Wassenhove (2009) describe the evolution of the research on closed-loop supply chains. Souza
(2013) provides a review and a tutorial of the literature on closed loop supply chains. He classified
the literature in terms of strategic, tactical, and operational issues. Tang and Zhou (2012)
provide a review of recent studies (between 1995-2012) in closed loop supply chain literature
based on a PPP (planet, people and profit) framework. Another recent survey is on production
planning and control for remanufacturing which is conducted by Junior and Filho (2012).
Competition in remanufacturing is a growing branch in the remanufacturing literature. Heese
et al. (2005) study a model of two OEMs and determine the conditions for the OEMs to sell
remanufactured products along with original products, also taking product substitutability into
account. Atasu et al. (2008) also consider direct OEM competition and include market growth
in their two-period setting. They assume that cores can be collected at a fixed price, but in our
study we assume that acquisition prices for used products are decision variables.
Ferguson and Toktay (2006) consider competition between a single OEM and a single IO
in a two-period model. They assume that an IO will only consider entering the market if the
OEM decides not to remanufacture itself. They argue that this is reasonable when the OEM
enjoys a brand advantage for its remanufactured product over the entrant’s product or if the
OEM enjoys a first-mover advantage in the recovery of the cores needed for remanufacturing.
Majumder and Groeneveld (2001) also consider the competition between a single OEM and a
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single IO in a two-period setting, and assume that the shell allocation mechanism is exogenous,
i.e., the fractions of returns to the OEM and IO are fixed. Ferrer and Swaminatham (2006)
extend the model of Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) to a multi-period setting. Different from
these contributions, in our model, the OEM and 3rd party remanufacturer compete with their
acquisition prices for cores.
Webster and Mitra (2007) and Mitra and Webster (2008) also analyze a two-period game
theoretic model that captures the competition between a single OEM and a single IO. Building
on the previous two-period model studies, both studies examine the effect of legislations and
regulations on the remanufacturing activities. Webster and Mitra (2007) study the effect of
take-back laws on the remanufacturing activities by considering two different implementations
of take back laws, namely, (i) the OEM has the control over the returns sold to IO and (ii) the
OEM has no control over the returns sold to IO. Mitra and Webster (2008) analyze the effect
of government subsidies on remanufacturing activities. In both studies it is assumed that the
OEM does not take part in remanufacturing activities.
Debo et al. (2005) investigate joint technology selection and pricing decisions for new and
remanufactured products. They derive the manufacturer’s optimal remanufacturing decisions as
well as conditions on the viability of remanufacturing. They also extend their results to the case
of competing remanufacturers. They assume that the price of used remanufacturable products
depends only on the supply of such products. So, different from our model, all parties offer the
same acquisition price, and all available (remanufacturable) cores are acquired.
4.3 System description
In this chapter, we consider the competition between an original-equipment manufacturer (OEM)
and an independent operator (IO) in a two-period setting. We model the decision process
as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the OEM decides on the number of products to
manufacture, q1n. Returned products are not yet available in that period. At the start of the
second period, both the OEM and the IO decide on the acquisition prices for returned products,
so and si, respectively. After obtaining the returned products, both decide on the number of
returns to remanufacture in period 2, namely q2o and q2i. At this point the OEM also decides
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on the number of products to manufacture, q2n. Obviously, the number of remanufactured
products by the OEM and IO are restricted by the number of products returned to them, ro
and ri respectively.
For modeling the demand functions, we adopt the same utility-based approach as Debo et
al. (2005) and Ferguson and Toktay (2006) where each consumer uses at most one product and
has willingness to pay for that product, θ, which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In
the first period, only new products are offered with selling price p1 and the utility of a consumer
for buying a new product is U1 = θ−p1. If the market size of the first period is M1, the quantity
sold in that period, q1n becomes q1n = M1(1− p1). Then, letting δ1 = 1/M1, we can derive the
inverse demand function as follows,
p1 = δ1(M1 − q1n). (4.1)
In the second period, both manufactured and remanufactured products are sold. In the main
part of this study, we assume that consumers cannot distinguish between the new and reman-
ufactured products i.e., consumers view the remanufactured products as perfect substitutes of
new ones. As stated before, in practice, this holds for some products (such as single-use cam-
eras, refillable cylinders and Fuji Xerox products in Japan), but obviously not for all products.
Although in the main body of the study we consider indistinguishable new and remanufactured
products, in Section 4.6, we relax this assumption and consider different selling price for the
new and remanufactured products.
Using the same argument above, the selling price for this period, p2 is derived in terms of
the amount of new products offered by the OEM, q2n and remanufactured products offered by
the OEM q2o and by the IO, q2i, as
p2 = δ2(M2 − q2n − q2o − q2i), (4.2)
where M2 is the market size in period 2, and δ2 = 1/M2.
To make the problem non-trivial and allow profitable manufacturing and remanufacturing
for the OEM, we assume that the cost of manufacturing new products, cn is less than δ2M2 and,
greater than the remanufacturing cost for the OEM, co, i.e., δ2M2 > cn > co and δ1M1 > cn.
We also assume that the number of products manufactured by the OEM in period 2 is
positive. This will hold in most real-life settings, as the number of remanufacturable returns is
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typically insufficient to switch ‘fully’ from manufacturing to remanufacturing. We remark that
the analysis for the case without manufacturing in the second period is similar to the one that
we will present, but will be omitted as this case is unrealistic and not as insightful.
Competition for return is modelled by modifying the commonly used demand attraction
model. This model can be derived axiomatically based on simple assumptions about consumer
behavior (Luce, 1959). It is a popular model for modeling competition for demands and, as we
will argue, is also suitable for modeling competition for returns in the following adapted form.
ro = βq1n
αoso




αoso + αisi + γ
, (4.4)
where 0 < β ≤ 1, αo > 0, αi > 0, γ ≥ 0.
This generalizes the demand attraction model in two ways. First, the additional parameter
β is introduced as it may not be possible to collect and remanufacture all items that were
manufactured in the first period, even at very high acquisition prices (Debo et al., 2005 and
Geyer et al., 2007). Second, αo and αi are positive rather than negative, as higher acquisition
prices lead to more returns. We remark that, similar to the demand attraction model, our
return attraction model can be generalized by using power functions instead of linear functions.
However, as price-return sensitivity is already modelled via αo, αi and γ, and to keep the analysis
tractable, we do not consider this generalized form.
A list of notation is given in Table 4.1. The objective of both the OEM and the IO is to
maximize their total profit, which is calculated as the difference between the sales revenue and
the acquisition and production costs. In the next section, we will determine the Nash equilibrium
for these two players and show that it is unique.
4.4 Optimal policies
In this section, we determine the optimal policies for both players. We start in Section 4.4.1 by
determining the unique, as it turns out to be, Nash equilibrium for the OEM and IO in period
2, given any value of q1n. Furthermore, we obtain insights from an analytical sensitivity study.
In Section 4.4.2, we show that the total profit over both periods for the OEM is concave in q1n,
and determine the first order optimality condition.
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Model Parameters
Mk; k = 1, 2 Potential market in period k
δk; k = 1, 2 Constant that links selling price to sales in period k
cn OEM’s cost of manufacturing per new product
co OEM’s cost of remanufacturing per remanufactured product
ci IO’s cost of remanufacturing per remanufactured product
αo, αi, β, γ Constants in the return attraction model
(Decision) Variables
pk; k = 1, 2 Sales price in period k
so Acquisition price offered by the OEM (in period 2)
si Acquisition price offered by the IO (in period 2)
qkn; k = 1, 2 Number of new products manufactured by the OEM in period k
q2o Number of products remanufactured by the OEM (in period 2)
q2i Number of products remanufactured by the IO (in period 2)
ro Number of products returned to the OEM (in period 2)
ri Number of products returned to the IO (in period 2)
Other notation
Πko; k = 1, 2 OEM’s profit in period k
Πo OEM’s total profit
Π2i IO’s profit in period 2
∆ (a+ b− 3βq1n)2 + 12bβq1n






First derivative of function f with respect to q1n
f
′′
Second derivative of function f with respect to q1n
∗ Denotes optimality, e.g. s∗o is the optimal acquisition price for the OEM
Table 4.1: Notation
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4.4.1 Nash equilibrium for period 2
The OEM’s profit in period 2 is
Π2o = p2(q2n + q2o)− cnq2n − coq2o − soro. (4.5)
The IO only operates in period 2 and IO’s profit is given by
Πi = Π2i = p2q2i − ciq2i − siri. (4.6)
An important observation from (4.5) and (4.6) is that neither player has an incentive to
acquire returns that it will not remanufacture, as it can increase its own profits by acquiring
fewer returns at a higher price. Therefore, our search for Nash equilibria can be restricted to
solutions where q2o = ro and q2i = ri. Such solutions are completely characterized by the set of
production quantities (q2n, q2o, q2i). The corresponding acquisition and sales prices result from
(4.2) to (4.4).







Using (4.2) - (4.4), it is easy to see that profit function (4.6) is concave in q2i. Also, (4.5) is
jointly concave in (q2n, q2o). (See Appendix 3.B.) Hence, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium
(q∗2n, q∗2o, q∗2i) given by the following first-order conditions:
M2 − 2q∗2n − 2q∗2o − q∗2i − cn/δ2 = 0, (4.8)
M2 − 2q∗2n − 2q∗2o − q∗2i − co/δ2 − 2s∗o/δ2 = 0, (4.9)
M2 − q∗2n − q∗2o − 2q∗2i − ci/δ2 − 2s∗i /δ2 = 0. (4.10)
The unique Nash equilibrium that results from these conditions is given in Theorem 4.4.1.
Theorem 4.4.1 The production quantities and acquisition prices for the unique Nash equilib-
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Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
An interesting observation from Theorem 4.4.1 is that the acquisition price for cores offered
by the OEM only depends on the cost difference cn− co between manufacturing and remanufac-
turing. So, the OEM’s acquisition price is independent from that of the IO, and in this respect
the OEM does not compete for cores. This result can be explained as follows. For any given
demand structure, the marginal production cost must be equal to the marginal revenue (giving
a marginal profit of zero) for the optimal solution. Therefore, as long as there is still production
of new products in the second period, the total production (i.e., new and remanufactured) is
not affected by the acquisition price and associated number of returns, since the marginal cost
of producing one additional new product must remain unchanged. It is also obvious that the
acquisition price must be less than cn − co for remanufacturing to be profitable for the OEM.
However, the result that the optimal acquisition price is exactly half of that "maximum saving
per return" results from our modeling of the competition for cores.
The complexity of the expressions in Theorem 4.4.1 for the other decision variables in period
2 does not allow us to directly obtain further insights into their dependency on q1n and on the
model parameters. Therefore, we obtain such insights analytically and numerically. We start
by analyzing the impact of q1n on the optimal decisions in period 2 in Theorem 4.4.2.
Theorem 4.4.2 The sensitivity of the optimal decision variables for period 2 with respect to
q1n is as follows.




(ii) q∗2n is decreasing in q1n and q∗2o is increasing in q1n;
(iii) (q∗2n + q∗2o) is decreasing in q1n;
(iv) (q∗2n + q∗2o + q∗2i) is increasing in q1n;
(v) s∗o is constant in q1n;
(vi) s∗i is decreasing in q1n.
Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
Results (i) and (ii) from Theorem 4.4.2 are intuitive. A larger number of available cores
leads to more returns for both the OEM and the IO. To compensate for the increased number
of remanufactured products in the market, the OEM manufactures less new products. And, as
(iii) shows, the total production by the OEM in period 2 decreases. However, the OEM and IO
together sell more products in period 2, as stated in (iv), and so the OEM loses market share.
We have already discussed the independency of the OEM’s acquisition price from q1n (and the
other decision variables), and (v) is included for completeness. Result (vi) shows that the IO
exploits a larger availability of cores by offering a lower acquisition price.
So, we know from Theorem 4.4.2 that increased manufacturing in the first period leads to
an increased amount of remanufacturing by both the OEM and the IO in the second period.
Theorem 4.4.3 shows further that an increase in q1n leads to an increased share of returns for
the OEM, and to a reduction in remanufacturing relative to the number of available cores.
Theorem 4.4.3 q∗2i/(βq1n) is decreasing in q1n, q
∗
2o/(βq1n) is increasing in q1n, and (q
∗
2i +
q∗2o)/(βq1n) is decreasing in q1n.
Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
We next examine the relationships between the acquisition prices s∗i and s
∗
o and between the
remanufactured quantities q∗2i and q
∗
2o.
Theorem 4.4.4 (a) We have
s∗i

> s∗o, q1n < qˆ1n;
= s∗o, q1n = qˆ1n;
< s∗o, q1n > qˆ1n,
(4.16)
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> q∗2o, q1n > q˜1n;
= q∗2o, q1n = q˜1n;
< q∗2o, q1n < q˜1n,
(4.18)











(c) If αo ≥ αi, then qˆ1n ≥ q˜1n. Otherwise, qˆ1n < q˜1n.
Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
As Theorem 4.4.4 shows, the acquisition price offered by the OEM can be both larger and
smaller than that of the IO, and the same holds for its returns market share. There are threshold
values for the production of new products in period 1, above which the OEM offers a higher
acquisition price acquires more cores than the IO in period 2.
In Section 4.5, we will derive further sensitivity results in a numerical study. Next, we derive
the optimal decision for the first period (given the optimal policies in period 2).
4.4.2 Optimal production in period 1
Using Theorem 4.4.1, the total profit for the OEM can be written as















The following theorem states that Πo is concave and provides the first order condition for
finding the optimal value of q1n.






(a+ b− 3βM1)3 (4.22)
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M1 M2 β αo αi cn co ci
Low 10 10 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.01
Medium 50 50 0.3 1 1 0.8 0.35 0.35
High 200 200 0.5 100 100 0.9 0.65 0.65
Table 4.2: Parameter values considered in the numerical investigation.
the total profit Πo for the OEM is strictly concave in q1n, and the first order condition is given
by



















Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
Due to the complexity of the optimality condition for q1n in Theorem 4.4.5, this does not
provide direct insights. However, we can analytically derive the effect of M1 on the optimal
production quantities and acquisition prices. It is found that an increase in M1 leads to more
manufacturing in period 1, and to more remanufacturing and less manufacturing in period 2.
Also, higher manufacturing implies more available cores and so, the acquisition price of the IO
decreases. (See Appendix 4.C.) In Section 4.5, we will derive further insights from a numerical
study. In that numerical study, we compare the profit of the OEM under two scenarios: with
remanufacturing and without remanufacturing. The comparison allows us to answer the question
how remanufacturing in a competitive market affects the bottom line of an OEM.
4.5 Numerical study
As stated before, the optimality condition for q1n given in Theorem 4.4.5 is too complex to
obtain direct insights. In this section, our objective is to obtain insights regarding both the
individual and combined effects of parameters on the production decisions and profitability of
remanufacturing. To achieve that, we consider a full factorial design with three different values
for 8 parameters (M1, M2, β, αo, αi, cn, co and ci) namely, low, medium and high while keeping
the value of γ at 0.3. All parameter values are listed in Table 4.2.
In total this gives 6561 potential data scenarios, but we only retained the scenarios for which
manufacturing and remanufacturing both take place. Based on the filtered data, we depicted
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 Figure 4.1: Impact of parameters on average production quantities (Parameter values are
ordered as low, medium and high).
the average quantities for each parameter when it is low, medium and high values of parameters
(from left to right) in Figure 4.1.
From Figure 4.1, we find that larger market M1 in period 1 leads to more manufacturing
q1n in that period. This implies that more cores are available in period 2, which leads to more
remanufacturing by both the OEM and IO, and less manufacturing by the OEM. An increased
production cost leads to lower manufacturing levels in both periods and less remanufacturing
in the second period. The reason is that costly manufacturing of new products leads to less
production in the first period, which implies fewer available cores in period 2. Low β values
also mean fewer returns and less remanufacturing in period 2. We see that there is a symmetry
in the effects of the parameters on q2o and q2i. For instance, higher remanufacturing cost for
the OEM or lower remanufacturing cost for the IO implies that the OEM is less competitive
on remanufacturing, which results in less remanufacturing by the OEM and more by the IO. In
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Figure 4.2: Changes in average q1n with respect to αo and M2 when αi = 100.
the reverse case, i.e., when remanufacturing is more costly for the IO and/or less costly for the
OEM, the IO remanufactures less and OEM remanufactures more. In Figure 4.1 we also see that
the collection coefficients αo and αi have a significant effect on the remanufacturing quantities.
An increase in αo or a decrease in αi makes it easier for the OEM to acquire cores relative to
the IO, and therefore leads to more remanufacturing and less manufacturing by the OEM in
the second period and less remanufacturing by the IO. On the contrary, the IO remanufactures
more if αo is low and/or αi is high. Also when αi is high, the OEM produces less in the first
period to provide fewer cores to the IO.
From Figure 4.1, we see that a larger market size in period 2 leads to more production in
period 1. The reason is that more manufacturing in the first period increases the availability
of cores in the second period, and thereby the potential cost savings from remanufacturing.
Even though q1n increases with M2 on average, there are some instances where we observe the
opposite. In Figure 4.2, we analyze the change in the average production amount in the first
period with respect to M2 and αo when the IO has a high collection coefficient (αi = 100). We
find that when it is difficult for the OEM to collect the available cores (αo = 0.01), an increase
in the market size in the second period leads lower manufacturing level q1n to reduce the market
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 Figure 4.3: Impact of parameters on so and si (Parameter values are ordered as low,
medium and high).
share of the IO in the second period.
The effect of parameters on the acquisition prices is presented in Figure 4.3. Note from this
figure that, as stated in Theorem 4.4.4, the acquisition price of the OEM can be both larger
and smaller than that of the IO. As expected, the acquisition price for the IO decreases if his
cost of remanufacturing increases. It also decreases if the cost of remanufacturing for the OEM
increases, as that leads to a lower acquisition price from the OEM and hence less competition for
cores. An increase in cn makes remanufacturing more profitable for the OEM, which therefore
increases its acquisition price (as also follows from Theorem 4.4.1). The increased competition
forces the IO to also raise its acquisition price. An increase in the market size in period 2 implies
that a higher sales price can be achieved, to which the IO reacts by raising its acquisition price
so that it obtains more cores. This also provides further explanation for the, earlier discussed,
counter-intuitive result that the OEM produces less new items in the first period if M2 increases.
The IO raises the acquisition price if M2 increases, thereby increasing its market share, and hence
the OEM lowers q1n to protect its market share.
Remanufacturing allows the OEM to reduce its production cost. However, it also allows the
IO to take over part of the market. So, what is the overall effect of having a remanufacturing
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 Figure 4.4: Effects of parameters on the average gain (Parameter values are ordered as
low, medium and high).
option on the OEM’s profit? This question is especially relevant if the OEM can prevent re-
manufacturing by for instance not designing for remanufacturing or making frequent changes
to a product as done by Lexmark, a well-known toner cartridges manufacturer. Lexmark offers
pre-bates to customers that ensures to return used cartridges. More recently, Lexmark changed
the design of its product by installing a chip to avoid remanufacturing by third parties.
We address the above question by comparing the OEM’s profit with remanufacturing as de-
termined in previous sections to the maximum profit without remanufacturing that is determined
next. For the non-remanufacturing model, the OEM’s profit is given by
δ1(M1 − q1n)q1n + δ2(M2 − q2n)q2n − cn(q1n + q2n).













In Figure 4.4 we analyze the effects of parameters on the average percentage gain. The
percentage gain for the OEM from remanufacturing is calculated as 100(Π∗o − Π˜o)/Π˜o where Π˜o
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 Figure 4.5: Combined effects of parameters on percentage gain. The percentage gain is
sorted in decreasing order where positive values are colored gray in the "gain" column.
For the parameters, black cells represent high values and white cells represent low values.
is given as in (4.24). As depicted in Figure 4.4, remanufacturing is a not a profitable option for
the OEM when the cost benefit of remanufacturing is less pronounced (high remanufacturing
cost or low production cost) and it is difficult for the OEM to collect available cores (low αo or
high αi). Also, the gain first increases then decreases with market sizes M1 and M2. This is
again due to the fact that competition is more intense in period 2 as more cores are available
and the market is bigger in the second period.
After discussing the individual effects of the different model parameters, we turn to their
combined effects. Figure 4.5 depicts the combined effects of parameters on gain. The percent-
age gain is sorted in decreasing order in Figure 4.5 where positive values are colored gray in the
"gain" column. For the parameters, black cells represent high values and white cells represent
low values. For readability, medium values are not included in this figure. We find that approxi-
mately the top 25% gain is reached when αo is high and the lowest 25% gain is obtained when αi
is high indicating that these parameters pay a crucial role. Also, as expected, remanufacturing
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is seldom beneficial when the remanufacturing is relatively costly for the OEM. Additionally,
when the OEM has an advantage on core acquisition, the gain is particularly high, if market
sizes for period 1 and 2 are similar. The explanation is that in such cases, there is sufficient
market in period 2 to sell a relatively (compared to total production over the life-cycle) large
number of remanufactured products. If the market in period 2 is much higher than in period 1,
all available cores can still be remanufactured, but relatively few cores are available and so the
profit gain is smaller. The gain is generally even smaller or negative if the market size is much
larger in period 1, as many returns arrive “too late” in the sense that the market is already
declining. Finally, the low gains are observed when it is more likely for the IO to collect fewer
available cores (high β) and the cost benefit of remanufacturing is less significant (low cn).
4.6 Different new and remanufactured products
In this section, we relax the assumption that new and remanufactured products are indistin-
guishable, and instead assume that consumers have a different willingness to pay for new and
remanufactured products. We mainly consider the case where the remanufactured products of
the OEM and IO are sold at the same price and at the end of this section we discuss the case
where consumers have higher willingness to pay for the OEMs remanufactured product.
A consumer of type θ (i.e., willingness to pay for new product equal to θ) has a willingness
to pay for the remanufactured product equal to Ψθ, where 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ 1. Then the inverse demand
functions can be written as follows,
p2n = δ2(M2 − q2n −Ψ(q2o + q2i)),
p2r = δ2Ψ(M2 − q2n − (q2o + q2i)).
The derivation for these functions is provided in Appendix 4.A. The OEM’s profit in period 2 is
Π2o = p2nq2n + p2rq2o − cnq2n − coq2o − soro. (4.25)
The IO only operates in period 2 and its profit is given by
Πi = Π2i = p2rq2i − ciq2i − siri. (4.26)
As in the case with indistinguishable new and remanufactured product; neither player has an
incentive to acquire returns that it will not remanufacture. Therefore, q2o = ro and q2i = ri still
98
hold. Additionally, similar to the previous case, the profit function (4.26) is concave in q2i, and
(4.25) is jointly concave in (q2n, q2o). (See Appendix 4.B.) Hence, there exists a unique Nash
Equilibrium (q∗2n, q∗2o, q∗2i) given by the following first-order conditions:
δ2(M2 − 2q∗2n − 2Ψq∗2o −Ψq∗2i)− cn = 0, (4.27)
δ2Ψ(M2 − 2q∗2n − 2q∗2o − q∗2i)− co − 2s∗o = 0, (4.28)
δ2Ψ(M2 − q∗2n − q∗2o − 2q∗2i)− ci − 2s∗i = 0. (4.29)









Note that in this case, s∗o depends not only on the cost structure but also on the market size and
the optimal manufacturing amount in the second period. Since the manufacturing amount affects
the prices of new as well as remanufactured products, the marginal revenue from remanufacturing
is different from the case with identical new and remanufactured products discussed in the
previous sections. This explains why s∗o no longer depends on cn and co only. Finding the
analytical optimal solution for the second period is complex in this case, and thus we conduct
a numerical study. Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012) compare online prices of new and
remanufactured products, and find that Ψ ranges from 0.60 to 0.85. Thus, in the numerical study
we take Ψ = 0.75 and for other parameters we use the values shown in Table 4.2. Figure 4.6
depicts the average values for the decision variables when new and remanufactured products sold
at the same price (represented by non-filled bars on left) or sold at different prices (represented
by filled bars on right).
From Figure 4.6, we observe similar trends for both situations concerning the effects of
parameters on the production quantities. For the acquisition prices, we find that both acquisition
prices are lower when the remanufactured products are sold at lower prices. This is due to
the fact that the marginal value for selling a remanufactured product will be lower when the
remanufactured products are indistinguishable.
In Figure 4.7, we analyze the change in the average production amount in the first period for
both cases with respect to M2 and αo when the IO has a high collection coefficient (αi = 100), as
we did in Section 6. Also for the case of differently perceived new and remanufactured products,
we find that when it is difficult for the OEM to collect the available cores (αo = 0.01), an increase
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 Figure 4.6: The changes in the production quantities and acquisition prices when new
and remanufactured products are sold at the same or different prices.
100
Figure 4.7: Changes in average q1n with respect to αo and M2 when αi = 100.
in the market size in the second period leads a lower manufacturing level, q1n, in period 1 in
order to reduce the market share of the IO in the second period.
Figure 4.8 compares the average percentage gain when new and remanufactured products
are sold at the same price (represented by non- filled bars on left) or sold at different prices
(represented by filled bars on right). We find that in general the percentage gain is smaller
when the remanufactured products are distinguishable. Also, the change in the percentage
gain with different values for each parameter is similar for distinguishable and indistinguishable
remanufactured product cases.
Figure 4.9 depicts a special case in Figure 4.8 where αi = 100, i.e., it is easy for IO to collect
the available cores. We find that for the situations where remanufacturing is not profitable
(compared to manufacturing only), the profit loss decreases when the products are sold at
different prices.
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 Figure 4.8: The changes in the average gain when new and remanufactured products are
sold at the same or different prices.
Figure 4.9: The changes in the average gain when new and remanufactured products are
sold at the same or different prices and αi = 100.
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4.6.1 OEM’s remanufactured products are more valuable than
IO’s
So far, in this section, we assumed that consumers have a different willingness to pay for new
and remanufactured products where consumers have the same willingness to pay for the OEM’s
and IO’s remanufactured product. However, it is also possible that a consumer has a higher
willingness to pay for the OEM’s product. To obtain insights for this situation, we assume that
the new and remanufactured products of the OEM are sold at the same price, p2n, and the
remanufactured products of the IO is sold at a lower price, p2r, and we conduct a numerical
study using the same parameter values shown in Table 4.2 and take Ψ = 0.75. The details of
the analysis and the results of the numerical study are provided in Appendix 3.D. We observe
that also for this case, the optimal acquisition price for the OEM only depends on its cost
structure. We compare the optimal production quantities and acquisition prices in this case
with the main case where new and remanufactured products are sold at the same price. We find
that the effects of the parameters on the optimal production quantities and acquisition prices
are similar. The average gain in this case is more than the case that the OEM’s remanufactured
products are also sold a discounted price. This implies that the effects of the parameters on
the optimal production quantities and profitability of remanufacturing will be similar when the
remanufactured products of the OEM and IO are sold at different discounted prices.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyze the effect of competition with an IO on the remanufacturing strategy
of an OEM in a two-period setting. Different from the current literature we consider competition
between the parties for collecting cores, next to the competition for market share. We determine
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium between the parties in period 2 and find the optimal
acquisition prices and (re)manufacturing quantities. Then, we consider period 1 and determine
the optimal manufacturing quantity for the OEM.
In the main part of the chapter, we analyze the case in which the new and remanufactured
products are sold for the same price. Analytical and numerical sensitivity analyses lead to several
managerial insights for this case. First of all, we find that OEM’s acquisition price only depends
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on its cost structure, not on IO’s acquisition price. In this sense, the OEM does not compete for
collecting cores. From the numerical analysis, we see that remanufacturing is a profitable option
for the OEM when it has a dominance in collecting the available cores and remanufacturing
leads cost savings. We also see that, when the cost benefits of remanufacturing diminishes and
the IO has more chance to collect the available cores, the OEM manufactures less in the first
period as the market in the second period gets larger to protect its overall market share.
We then consider the case where consumers have lower willingness to pay for the remanufac-
tured products. We find that the effect of the parameters on the optimal production quantities
and acquisition prices are similar with the case of indistinguishable remanufactured products.
We also find that the acquisition prices offered both by the OEM and IO decreases, and reman-
ufacturing becomes less profitable overall.
In this chapter we make some limiting assumptions. First of all, we consider a two-period
problem where the OEM and the IO competes both to acquire available cores and to sell products
in the second period. For multiple period cases, the problem would be intractable since the
concavity of the profit functions is lost or at least cannot easily be proven. We also assumed
that the consumers’ willingness to pay for the products is uniformly distributed which leads
to linear inverse demand functions. In further research, other distributions can also be used
for modeling consumers’ willingness to pay for the products. Other possible research areas are
considering random demand and competition between more than two parties can be considered.
Finally, capacity restrictions can be included.
Appendix 4.A. Derivation of inverse demand functions
Net utility of a consumer, NU , is
NU = Ψmθ − p2z,
where m = 0 and z = n if the product is new, and m = 1 and z = r if the product is
remanufactured. A consumer has 3 different strategies, based on the value of NU : purchase a
new product, strategy N ; purchase a remanufactured product, strategy R; and purchase nothing,
strategy X. First, consider the lowest valuation consumer who adopts an R strategy i.e., the
consumer who is indifferent between strategy R and X. In this case, θ = δ2(M2 − q2n − q2r)
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where q2r = q2o + q2i.
NUR = δ2Ψ(M2 − q2n − q2r)− p2r = 0 = NUX
where the net utility of the consumer from strategy R is NUR, and the net utility of the consumer
from strategy X is NUX . This implies p2r = δ2Ψ(M2 − q2n − q2r). Then, consider the lowest
valuation consumer who adopts an N strategy i.e., the consumer who is indifferent between
strategy N and R. In this case, θ = δ2(M2 − q2n).
NUN = δ2(M2 − q2n)− p2n = δ2Ψ(M2 − q2n)− p2r = NUR
where NUN is the net utility of the consumer from strategy N p2r = δ2Ψ(M2− q2n− q2r). This
implies p2n = δ2(M2 − q2n −Ψq2r).
Appendix 4.B. Proof of theorems
Proof of joint concavity of (4.5)















From, these derivatives we construct the Hessian for (4.5) as
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −2δ2 −2δ2−2δ2 −2δ2 − 2αisiαoq2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
It can easily be seen that the Hessian is negative definite since −2δ2 < 0 and 4δ2αisi/αoq2i > 0.
Thus, (4.5) is jointly concave with respect to q2n and q2o.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.1
Combining (4.8) and (4.9) gives (4.11). By substituting (4.8) into (4.10), we have
M2 − 3q∗2i + (c− 2ci)/δ = 4si/δ. (4.30)
By substituting (4.4) into (4.30), we have
q∗2i =
a+ b+ 3βq1n ±
√




where a = M2 + (c− 2ci)/δ and b = 4(αos∗o + γ)/(αiδ).
Note that by (4.30), since si ≥ 0, we require that q2i ≤ a/3. Since q2i ≤ a/3, the unique
solution is given by
q∗2i =
a+ b+ 3βq1n −
√
(a+ b+ 3βq1n)2 − 12aβq1n
6
=
a+ b+ 3βq1n −
√
(a+ b− 3βq1n)2 + 12bβq1n
6
,






















which give (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15). This completes the proof.
Proof of theorem 4.4.2
(i) We have




q∗′2i = 3β − 1/2∆−1/2(−6β(a− b− 3βq1n)).
We consider two cases. Case I: a − b − 3βq1n ≥ 0. Then, it is clear that q∗′2i > 0. Condition
q∗′2i < β is equivalent to ∆
1/2 > a− b− 3βq1n, which obviously holds from the definition of ∆.
Case II: a− b− 3βq1n < 0. It is clear that q∗′2i < β. Condition q∗′2i > 0 is equivalent to
∆1/2 > b+ 3βq1n − a.
This can be rewritten as
(a+ b− 3βq1n)2 + 12bβq1n > (b+ 3βq1n − a)2,




(ii) This follows from (4.14), (4.15), and part (i) of this theorem.
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M2 − cn/δ2 − q∗2i
2
.
Combining this with (i) of this theorem, it is clear that (q∗2n + q∗2o) is decreasing in q1n.






M2 − cn/δ2 + q∗2i
2
.
which is increasing in q1n.
(v) This follows directly from Theorem 4.4.1.









Therefore, showing that s∗i is decreasing in q1n is equivalent to showing that q1nq
∗′






∆1/2 + [(a+ b− 3βq1n)− 2b]
2∆1/2
− a+ b+ 3βq1n −
√
(a+ b− 3βq1n)2 + 12bβq1n
6
=
(a+ b)[(a+ b− 3βq1n)−∆1/2] + 6βbq1n
6∆1/2
.
By simple algebra, we can show that
(a+ b)[(a+ b− 3βq1n)−∆1/2] + 6βbq1n < 0.
Thus, we have q1nq
∗′
2i − q∗2i < 0, and hence s∗i is decreasing in q1n.
Proof of theorem 4.4.3







∆1/2 + (a− b− 3βq1n)
2∆1/2
− a+ b+ 3βq1n −∆
1/2
6
∼ ∆2 + 3βq1n(a− b− 3βq1n)− (a+ b)∆1/2.
By simple algebra, it is not difficult to show that ∆2+3βq1n(a−b−3βq1n)−(a+b)∆1/2 < 0. Thus,
(q∗2i/βq1n)
































′ < 0, as shown above (q∗2i + q
∗
2o)/(βq1n) is also decreasing in q1n.
Proof of theorem 4.4.4
Part (a) follows from (4.11), (4.13) and Theorem 4.4.3 (vi). Part (b) follows from similar
arguments and by using (4.7). Combining parts (a) and (b) leads to part (c).
Proof of theorem 4.4.5
The first-order condition (4.23) follows directly from (4.20) and (4.21). By taking the second

























































In Theorem 2, we proved that 0 < ∂q∗2i/∂q1n < β holds. Also ∂
2q∗2i/∂q
2
1n < 0. Let us focus
on M2 − q∗2i − (coαos∗o + cnγ/δ2(αos∗o + γ)). We have





< M2(1− co)− q2i < M2(1− co) (4.36)






















− β2 − β2 6abM2(1− co)
∆3/2















− β2 − β2 6abM2(1− co)
(a+ b− 3βq1n)3 .
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Finally, (a+ b− 3βq1n) > (a+ b− 3βM1) holds, since q1n ≤M1 is reduced to have nonnegative




Proof of joint concavity of (4.25)















From, these derivatives we construct the Hessian for (4.25) as
H =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −2δ2 −2δ2Ψ−2δ2Ψ −2δ2Ψ− 2αisiαoq2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
It can easily be seen that the Hessian is negative definite since −2δ2 < 0 and 4δ2(δ2(1 − Ψ) +
αisi/αoq2i) > 0. Thus, (4.25) is jointly concave with respect to q2n and q2o.
Appendix 4.C. Sensitivity analysis w.r.t M1
It is known that q∗1n is the solution of



















Let f(M1,M2, c, co, ci, αi, αo, β, δ, γ, q
∗











= 0. Then, according to the Implicit Function Theorem, for any parameter x,

















− cn − δ2 q
∗′
2i



















= 2q1n/M1 > 0. Thus,
∂q∗1n
∂M1
> 0 i.e. q∗1n increases as M1 increases. Then, q2i and
q2o increase, and q2n and si decrease with M1 by applying Theorem 2.
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Appendix 4.D. Different remanufactured products by
the OEM and the IO
Here, we assume that a consumer has a higher willingness to pay for the OEM’s product. To
obtain insights for this situation, we assume that the new and remanufactured products of the
OEM are sold at the same price, p2n, and the remanufactured products of the IO is sold at price
p2r.
Then the inverse demand functions can be written as follows,
p2n = δ2(M2 − q2n − q2o −Ψq2i),
p2r = δ2Ψ(M2 − q2n − q2o − q2i).
The OEM’s profit in period 2 is
Π2o = p2n(q2n + q2o)− cnq2n − coq2o − soro. (4.37)
The IO only operates in period 2 and its profit is given by
Πi = Π2i = p2rq2i − ciq2i − siri. (4.38)
As in the case with indistinguishable new and remanufactured product; neither player has an
incentive to acquire returns that it will not remanufacture. Therefore, q2o = ro and q2i = ri still
hold. Additionally, similar to the indistinguishable new and remanufactured product case the
profit function (4.38) is concave in q2i, and (4.37) is jointly concave in (q2n, q2o). Hence, there
exists a unique Nash Equilibrium (q∗2n, q∗2o, q∗2i) given by the following first-order conditions:
δ2(M2 − 2q∗2n − 2q∗2o −Ψq∗2i)− cn = 0, (4.39)
δ2(M2 − 2q∗2n − 2q∗2o −Ψq∗2i)− co − 2s∗o = 0, (4.40)
δ2Ψ(M2 − q∗2n − q∗2o − 2q∗2i)− ci − 2s∗i = 0. (4.41)





In this case, s∗o again only depends on the cost structure of the OEM. Finding the analytical
optimal solution for the second period is also complex for this case, and thus we also conduct a
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numerical study using the same parameter values shown in Table 5.2 and take Ψ = 0.75. Figure
4.10 shows that the effect of the paraders on the optimal production quantities and acquisition
prices are similar to the case when all remanufactured and new products in the second period are
sold at the same price. Figure 4.11 shows that as expected the profitability of remanufacturing is
higher for this case since the effect of competition with the IO for the market sales is decreased.
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 Figure 4.10: The changes in the production quantities and acquisition prices when the
OEM’s and IO’s remanufactured products are sold at different prices.
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Figure 4.11: The changes in the average gain when the OEM’s and IO’s remanufactured
products are sold at different prices.
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Chapter 5
Cooperation in the returns channel
In this chapter, we analyze cooperation between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to
increase the efficiency of the reverse channel performance by using cooperative game theory.
We analyze under which conditions it is beneficial for OEMs to form a coalition in setting up
a returns network, and determine stable gain allocation schemes. Important insights are that
cooperation creates a significant increase in profit if OEMs have comparable revenues / savings
per returned item, but not necessarily similar market shares. Moreover, cooperation is more
beneficial for higher economies of scale in collection activities.
5.1 Introduction
Over the last fifty years, the level of consumption has been continuously increasing because of
the rapid technological development of new products and the growing desire of consumers to
acquire the latest technology. As a result, the world now faces serious environmental threats:
waste and the presence of toxic materials in the discarded products (Pochampally et al., 2009).
Sustainable production processes and closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) are becoming more
important because of these threats. CLSC management is defined as the design, control and
operation of a system to maximize value creation over the entire life cycle of the product with
dynamic recovery of value from different types and volume of returns over time (Guide and
Van Wassenhove, 2009). In addition to traditional forward supply chain activities, CLSCs
include the following steps: collecting the used/discarded items, reverse logistics to move the
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used items from the points of use to points of disposition, testing, sorting, and disposition to
understand the items condition and the most economically attractive reuse option, deciding on
the most beneficial refurbishing option (direct reuse, repair, remanufacture, recycle or disposal),
remarketing the refurbished product (Guide et al., 2003).
In this chapter we focus on collecting the used/discarded items step. Some companies collect
used items directly from the customers, but others may prefer independent third parties (e.g.,
Genco) to handle used product collection (Kaya, 2010). Cooperation between the OEMs in
collection activities is also possible, as illustrated by the following examples. In 1990, Kodak
established alliances with Fuji and Konica at the collection facilities to collect returned single-
used cameras. This alliance resulted in a return rate of 63% in the US, or 50 million cameras per
year (Fleischmann, 2001; Aras et al., 2004). In Japan, Fuji Xerox, Ricoh and Canon have formed
partnerships to collect and return each other’s used photocopier machines. Six printer ink and
toner ink cartridge OEMs (Epson, Canon, Hewlett-Packard, Brother, Dell, and Lexmark) have
collaborated to collect used ink cartridges (Matsumoto and Umeda, 2011).
Motivated by these real life cases, in this chapter we consider cooperation between OEMs
on collecting the used items, and our aim is to determine the conditions where cooperation is
beneficial and to find an efficient allocation of cost savings between the parties using cooperative
game theory. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore cooperation between OEMs
in setting up reverse logistics networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related reman-
ufacturing and cooperative game theory literature. Section 5.3 describes the system that we
analyze and provides preliminaries in the cooperative game theory. In Section 5.4, we introduce
interaction between the multiple OEMs and analyze the collection game. Finally in Section 5.5,
a brief summary of the findings and managerial insights are provided, and avenues for further
research are discussed.
5.2 Related literature
There are numerous studies on closed-loop supply chains in the current literature. Fleischmann
et al. (1997) and Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009) provide excellent reviews.
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Two main streams of game theory, namely non-cooperative and cooperative game theory,
have been applied widely in the supply chain management literature (Cachon and Netessine,
2004; Leng and Parlar, 2005). In CLSCs, non-cooperative games have also been addressed by
several authors. Heese et al. (2005) and Atasu et al. (2008) consider competition between
two OEMs. Majumder and Groeneveld (2001), Ferguson and Toktay (2006), and Ferrer and
Swaminatham (2006) analyze competition between an OEM and an independent remanufacturer.
Debo et al. (2005) consider competition between independent remanufacturers. Guide and
Wassenhove (2006) point out that reverse supply chain coordination and incentive alignment
are important research issues. Savaskan et al. (2004) and Kaya (2010) address these issues.
Although they again use non-cooperative game theory, these studies are most closely linked to
ours and we therefore next discuss them in more detail.
Savaskan et al. (2004) consider the problem of determining the best reverse channel structure
to collect returns. They analyze three options for collecting the used-products: (1) collecting
directly from the customers, (2) utilizing the retailers, (3) subcontracting the collection activity
to a third party. In their scenarios they assume that new and remanufactured products are
indistinguishable and that the acquisition price for the returned products is exogenous. Kaya
(2010) considers coordination between a single manufacturer and a single collection agency by
contracts offered by the manufacturer. In his model, the manufacturer produces both new
products and remanufactured products and the collection agency manages the collection of the
returns by offering incentives to customers. He determines the optimal combination of incentive
and production amounts in a stochastic demand setting where the retail prices of the new and
remanufactured products are exogenous.
Although cooperative game theory has many application for traditional supply chains (see
also Nagarajan and Sosic (2008), Dror and Hartman (2011) and Fiestas-Janeiro (2011) for
detailed reviews) and there are many cooperation cases in practice, its use is CLSCs are very
limited. Gui (2012) uses notions of cooperative game theory to derive fair cost allocations
for collection and recycling networks. In this chapter, we investigate whether cooperation in
collecting used items leads to cost-savings for all involved parties and, if so, we try to find
efficient allocations of cost savings using cooperative game theory.
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5.3 System description
In this section, we describe the system and provide some preliminaries on cooperative game
theory.
Let D denote the total demand for either a single OEM or multiple cooperating OEMs. We
model the relationship between the investment I of one or more OEMs and the return rate τ as,
I = Lτ2Da
where L is the scaling parameter to assure 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, is the parameter related
to economies of scale. Firms that are in the same coalition will have the same return rates since
they use same channels and facilities to collect the used/discarded items.
Savaskan et al. (2004) note that similar forms of response functions without economies
of scale have been widely used in the advertising response models of consumer retention and
product awareness, and also in the marketing literature as sales force effort response models.
(Note that there is no benefit from cooperation for a = 1 (as investments simply add up) and
full benefit for a = 0.)
There are n, n ≥ 1, OEMs. For each collected used product, OEM i obtains a positive
benefit ∆i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This benefit can result from recycling or remanufacturing activities.
Kodak’s design for disassembly and recovery enables it to remanufacture at a cost below that
of manufacturing (Savaskan et al., 2004). The green remanufacturing program saves Xerox
40%-65% in manufacturing costs through the reuse of parts and materials (Ginsburg, 2001).
If remanufactured products are indistinguishable from new ones (as for Fuji Xerox in Japan
and Kodak), then the cost savings is directly translated into the benefit per collected item. If
remanufactured products are sold at a lower price, then the price difference should be subtracted
to obtain the (net) benefit from remanufacturing. In such cases, the net benefit typically remains
positive. Indeed, this usually provides the incentive to collect returns. However, even if it is
not, it may still be beneficial to collect used items in order to discourage 3rd parties from
remanufacturing, e.g., for toner cartridges (Matsumoto and Umeda, 2011), although the benefit
per collected item may be harder to be quantified.
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5.3.1 Cooperative game: Preliminaries and notation
Let N = {1, .., n} denote the set of players, also referred as the grand coalition. Let v(S)
denote the characteristic function that assigns a profit value (representing the total amount of
transferable utility) to each coalition S ⊆ N (v(∅) = 0).
Given a game (N, v), any vector pi = (pii)i∈N ∈ RN is called a payoff vector, with pii being the
payoff to be given to player i ∈ N under the condition that cooperation in the grand coalition
is reached. A payoff vector pi ∈ Rn is an imputation for the game (N, v) if it is efficient and
individually rational, i.e., (i)
∑
i∈N pii = v(N);(ii) pii ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
The set of imputations of the game (N, v) is denoted by I(v) and it can easily been seen
that I(v) is empty iff v(N) <
∑









pii ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
}
.
The core of a coalitional game requires coalitional rationality in addition to efficiency and
individual rationality. It can be interpreted as the set of all allocations of the grand coalition’s
worth upon which no coalition can improve (Osbourne, 2004).
Finally, we introduce several useful properties of TU-Games. A TU-game is monotone if
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N it holds that v(S) ≤ v(T ). Monotonicity can be interpreted as larger
coalitions having larger values. A TU-game is superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for
S∩T = ∅ and S, T ⊆ N . For superadditive games it is efficient for the players to form the grand
coalition. Finally a TU-game is convex if for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N\ {i} we have that
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ). In convex games, the marginal contribution of player
i increases as the coalition gets larger. It is known that convex games have a non-empty core
(Shapley, 1971). Moreover, convexity of the game is a sufficient condition for the existence of
a populational monotonic allocation scheme, PMAS, which is introduced by Sprumont (1990).
PMAS reflects the intuition that there is strength in numbers, i.e., an allocation scheme for
a game (N, v) is population monotonic if each player’s payoff increases as the coalition the
player belongs to grows larger (Voorneveld et al., 2003). For a TU-game, (N, v), a scheme a =
(aiS)i∈S,S∈2N\{∅} of real numbers is a PMAS of v if (i)
∑
i∈S(aiS) = v(S) for all S ∈ 2N\ {∅} ,(ii)
aiS ≤ aiT for all S, T ∈ 2N\ {∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S. Moreover, every core allocation of a
convex game can be reached through a PMAS.
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5.4 Collection game
In the general collection game that we consider, multiple OEMs invest in collection activities
to increase the return rate of used items. To analyze the collection game, we define a general
collection situation as a tuple 〈N, a, L, {Di}i∈N , {∆i}i∈N 〉.











































) ≥ 0. (5.2)
It is not straightforward to find the combination of benefits, demand rates/shares and
economies of scale factor for which (5.2) holds. In what remains of this section, we will there-
fore derive insights by focusing on special cases. The first is that of a = 0, and the reason for
considering this case as follows.
It easily follows (See Appendix 5.A.) from (5.2) that the benefit of cooperation decreases
with a as expected. Also, if there are no economies of scale (i.e., when a = 1), then there is
no positive benefit from cooperation. (See Appendix 5.B.) As we will show in Section 5.1, a
non-empty set of imputations and a non-empty core does always exist for a = 0, i.e., if there are
full economies of scale. Although this seems intuitive, it is not straightforward since cooperation
in a joint collection scheme implies one identical return ratio for all participants, although their
individually optimal return ratios and corresponding investments may differ from each other
considerably.
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5.4.1 Special Case 1: Full Economies of Scale (a = 0)











) ≥ 0 ∀Di,∆i i ∈ N.







Proposition 5.4.1 For a = 0, the collection game is superadditive, monotone and convex.
Proof. We need to show that for all S ⊂ N, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that :
v[1](S ∪ T ) ≥ v[1](S) + v[1](T ).















which indeed always holds since Di∆i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Obviously,
∑
i∈S Di∆i is increasing in the number of elements in S for all non-negative Di
and ∆i. Also, for all non-negative x, x
2 is a monotonically increasing and convex function.
Thus, it follows immediately that (N, v[1]) is monotone and convex.
Since we know that the collection game (N, v[1]) is superadditive and convex, we also have
that forming the grand coalition is beneficial for the firms and that the core of the game exists.
Having proven the existence of the core, it is important to established how it can be reached, i.e.,
what allocation scheme for the joint benefit is “acceptable” for all players. The next proposition
shows that the proportional allocation rule achieves this, under which the benefit received by a




































Thus, pip(v[1]) ∈ C(v[1]).
As stated before, every core allocation of a convex game can be reached through a PMAS.
Thus, we can also reach proportional allocation rule through a PMAS. This is an important result
as it implies that the proportional rule, which is attractive because of its simplicity, satisfies the
property of population-monotonicity that requires each player initially present to gain upon the
arrival of new players.
Moreover, the proportional rule is stable against the artificial splitting or merging of players.
In other words, there is no incentive for the multiple players to artificially present themselves as
a single player, for a single player to artificially present himself as a group of players.
5.4.2 Special Case 2: Equal benefits per collected item (∆i = ∆)
Intuitively, a grand coalition is more likely to be formed if all OEMs have similar benefits. In this
subsection, we consider the case in which all parties have the same cost benefit per collected item,
i.e., ∆i = ∆ for every i ∈ N , which would arise if both use similar recycling or remanufacturing
technology. Let v[2] denote the characteristic function for this case.
Proposition 5.4.3 If all players have the same benefit ∆ per used item, then the collection
game is superadditive, monotone and convex.
Proof. For all S ⊂ N, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = ∅ we have that
v[2](S ∪ T ) ≥ v[2](S) + v[2](T ),




















i∈S Di is increasing in the number of elements in S for all non-negative Di.
Also, for all non-negative x, x(2−a) is monotonically increasing and convex function. Thus, it
follows that (N, v[2]) is monotone and convex.
Similar to Case 1, we consider the proportional rule pip(v[2]) for allocating the benefit of











Proposition 5.4.4 For the collection game with equal benefits per collected core, the propor-
tional payoff pip(v[2]) is an element of the core.
Proof. It easily follows that
∑
i∈N pi
p(v[2]) = v[2](N) and that for all non-empty coalitions S of



















Thus, pip(v[2]) ∈ C(v[2]).
Similar to Case 1, we can also reach the proportional rule through a PMAS in this case and
it is again stable against the artificial splitting or merging players.
5.4.3 Special Case 3: Two players (|N | = 2)
The previous two special cases for any number of players have shown that the core exists and
can be reached through the proportional rule if there is either full economies of scale or equal
benefits for each collected item for all players. Based on this, one expects that the core is more
likely to exist for smaller values of a and more similar benefits. To analyze this, we consider the
two players case. This will also shed insights on the effect of demand rates/market shares.
Let us define the ratios of demands and cost savings of the two OEMs as D2/D1 = γ and
∆2/∆1 = θ, respectively. From (5.1), we obtain the values for v({1}), v({2}), and v({1, 2}) when
S = {1}, S = {2} and S = {1, 2}, respectively. Then, after making necessary simplifications, we
get that cooperation is beneficial if
0 ≤ (1 + θγ)2 − (1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a)).
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Let us define the relative benefit of cooperation (RBC) as the percentage increase in profit of
cooperation over the sum of individual profits, i.e.,
RBC =
(1 + θγ)2 − (1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a))
(1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a))
× 100.
Note that the demand and benefit ratios matter rather than the separate values, which allows
us to depict the benefit of cooperation graphically in these two ratios for a given value of a. This
is illustrated for several values of a in Figure 5.1. This figure confirms our expectations that
benefits are larger for smaller values of a and more similar cost savings (θ is close to 1). The
effect of demand ratio is more complex. For sufficiently small values of a, so that cooperation is
indeed beneficial, if one of the OEM has a smaller benefit per collected item, then it is ‘better’ if
the same firm has a larger market share. This ensures that both players still have an incentive
to collect many returns, because of either the larger benefit per collected used item or the large
number of collected used items. Indeed, let us define β as the ratio of optimal return rates of
OEMs, i.e., β = τ∗{2}/τ
∗
{1}. Then, using (5.1), we can write β as, β = θγ
(1−a). Figure 5.2 shows
that when β is close to 1, the benefit of cooperation is particularly large. In fact, as stated in
the next proposition, the RBC is always at its maximum for β = 1.
Proposition 5.4.5 For N = {1, 2} there is maximum benefit of cooperation if the players’
individual optimal return rates are equal, (i.e., β = 1).
Proof. For any given γ, and a, let us define
f(θ) =
(1 + θγ)2 − (1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a))
(1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a))
.
Differentiating f(θ) with respect to θ, we have
f ′(θ) = 2γ(1 + θγ)
1− θγ1−a
(1 + γ)a(1 + θ2γ(2−a))2
.
It is clear that f(θ) is strictly increasing in θ for θ < γa−1 and is strictly decreasing in θ for
θ > γa−1. Thus, θ = γa−1 is the global maximizer. By definition, this is equivalent to β = 1.
So, a larger benefit per collected item for one player should ideally be balanced by a larger
market share for the other player, where the economies of scale parameter has a moderating
effect.
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Figure 5.1: Effect of γ and θ on the relative benefit of cooperation for different
values of a.
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In this chapter, we study supply chain cooperation between OEMs who can jointly invest in
activities to collect used products. An important insight is that comparable benefits per collected
item provides an important incentive for OEMs to set up a joint collection network. Indeed,
for the case with equal benefits per collected used item, which for instance arises if OEMs use
the same recovery technology, it is shown that the grand coalition is always formed (i.e., that
the core exists) for any number of players and all settings of other parameters in the considered
model. The analysis of the two player game shows that if cost asymmetry does exist, then a
coalition is more likely to be formed if the OEM with a lower benefit per collected item has
a higher market share. So, similar sized market shares do not necessarily motivate OEMs to
cooperate, but similar individual return rates do.
An intuitive finding is that the OEMs are more likely to jointly set up a network if there
are higher economies of scale (lower value of a). In the absence of economies of scale (a = 1),
there is obviously no benefit from cooperation. For the case with full economies of scale (a = 0),
the grand coalition is always beneficial. The latter is not straightforward, as the grand coalition
forces all participants to use the same collection network and therefore to settle on the same
return rate, although their individual preferences may vary considerably.
For both discussed special cases, either with equal benefits per core or full economies of scale,
the cooperation game is monotone, superadditive and convex. From these properties, we obtain
that the well-known and easy-to-apply proportional rule is an efficient way to allocate the total
benefits of the grand coalition, and that this rule can be reached through a PMAS.
Limitations of this research mainly relate to the modelling of the investment as a function
of the return rate and the economies of scale. Although the quadratic relation with the return
rate has been proposed in the past and this form is commonly studied in the broader investment
literature, other relations can also be considered. Also, economies of scale can be modelled
differently from our ‘power function’ approach. In particular, varying economies of scale for
different sets of OEMs could be considered, depending for instance on the geographical overlap
of their markets.
Another interesting direction for further research is to simultaneously consider competition
between OEMs in selling new products and cooperation in collecting returns. This could be
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modelled as a two-stage game. Finally, competition of OEMs with 3rd party remanufacturers
can also be considered.



















































> lnDi, for any Di > 0, we have that
∂ΨN (a)
∂a < 0 holds. Thus, ΨN (a) is
strictly decreasing in a. 
Appendix 5.B. Proof of no benefit from cooperation
for the case with a = 1
The proof is by induction. For |N | = 2 we have
Ψ{1,2}(1) = (D1∆1 +D2∆2)2 − (D1∆21 +D2∆22)(D1 +D2)
= D1D2(2∆1∆2 −∆21 −∆22)

































































Therefore, if a = 1, then v(N)−∑i∈N v({i}) ≤ 0 always holds.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and directions for
further research
The final chapter presents the research findings of the thesis, discusses the conducted research
and provides some directions for future research.
Closed loop supply chains and product recovery options have gained increased attention both
from industry and academia due to environmental and economical problems such as depletion
of natural resources, shortage of key minerals and metals, and waste with toxic materials.
Remanufacturing is an advanced product recovery strategy that is defined as the process of
bringing used products to a “like-new” functional state with a warranty to match. This thesis
focuses on remanufacturing strategy and aims to provide analytical tools for firms to determine
optimal pricing, manufacturing and remanufacturing strategies. To achieve this broad objective
with a focused research, the thesis is organized as a combination of research papers. Each paper
addresses a specific research question related to different aspects of remanufacturing. In Chapters
2 and 3, we consider a single OEM who performs both manufacturing and remanufacturing. The
first aspect is simultaneous consideration of two remanufacturing activities namely, product
acquisition management and pricing of new and remanufactured products which is analyzed
further in Chapter 2. The second aspect is that of remanufacturing strategy with a capacitated
setting and this is addressed in Chapter 3. In Chapters 4 and 5 consider multiple agents in a
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closed loop supply chain. In Chapter 4, competition between an OEM and an IO is analyzed and
in Chapter 5, cooperation between multiple OEMs for returned items collection is considered.
In the following paragraphs, the summary of the results and the further research directions are
provided for each individual chapter included in the thesis.
Chapter 2 deals with product acquisition management, pricing of new and remanufactured
products, and addresses the research question: What is the optimal quantity and quality of the
acquired cores and the price at which new and remanufactured products are sold? the main
contribution of the chapter is simultaneous consideration of two key remanufacturing activities
namely, product acquisition management and pricing of the new and remanufactured products.
In the problem formulation, there exists an OEM that manufactures new items as well as re-
manufactures returned items where returned items are classified into different types. The OEM
decides both on how much to purchase from each return type (with the acquisition prices of-
fered) and under which price to sell new and remanufactured items, where consumers have lower
willingness to pay for the remanufactured items. In Chapter 2, an algorithm is derived to find
the closed-form optimal solution. The main findings in Chapter 2 are as follows. In line with
the results in literature, the profit per new item only depends on the manufacturing cost, and
instead of having an equal profit per remanufactured item from all return types, the profit per
item is higher if the total cost for acquisition and remanufacturing is lower. The main manage-
rial implication is that although practitioners may find it intuitive and/or fair to apply equal
profits, doing so is suboptimal. Possible future research directions are to analyze two or multiple
period settings where the available number of returns in a period depends on the product sales
in the prior period, to consider different selling prices for different core types, and to include a
competing third party remanufacturer.
In Chapter 3, the following research questions are addressed: (i) What is the impact of
remanufacturing on the optimal capacity and production decisions? (ii) If remanufacturing is
either more costly or more capacity intensive, can it still be profitable? The main contribution
of this chapter is to analyze the combined effects of cost and capacity usage of remanufacturing
on production and capacity decision and on the profitability of remanufacturing. The analysis
is done for a two-period model with capacity and manufacturing decisions in the first period
and manufacturing and remanufacturing decisions in the second period for three different sce-
130
narios regarding the relative cost and capacity requirement of remanufacturing. First, the most
preferred and realistic scenario, which is less costly and less capacity intensive remanufacturing,
is considered. Closed-form solutions are derived for all capacity and production decisions and
used to conduct a sensitivity analysis. The main findings of this chapter are as follows. In some
cases, remanufacturing only replaces manufacturing to reduce cost leaving the total production
in the second period unchanged. However, for other cases, remanufacturing does increase the
total production quantity. A particularly interesting finding is that the availability of the less
capital intensive remanufacturing option sometimes leads to an increased capital investment. In
such cases, the additional investment is made to increase production in period 1 and thereby
the number of returns in period 2. In other cases, with surplus capacity in the first period,
introducing the remanufacturing option does lead to a reduction in the capacity investment.
The scenarios in which remanufacturing is either more costly or more capacity intensive
than manufacturing are analyzed in a numerical study. It turns out that the scenario where
remanufacturing is more costly is by far the least beneficial and remanufacturing can retain
considerable benefits if it is more capacity intensive, but only if the cost and market conditions
are such that there is sufficient capacity in the latter stage of the life-cycle (period 2). One
possible extension can be to consider a stochastic return rate due to the market uncertainty.
Also, more than two-periods would allow a more accurate description of a product life-cycle.
Inclusion of other players such as collectors and/or OEMs and inroducting competition for
collecting cores and/or selling (re)manufactured products can be considered.
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of competition with an IO on the remanufacturing strategy
of an OEM in a two-period setting and addresses the following research questions: (i) What
are the optimal production and pricing strategies of the parties in a supply chain in the case of
competition? (ii) What is the effect of competition on the remanufacturing strategy? The main
contribution of the model to the existing literature is to model competition between the parties
for collecting cores, next to the competition for market share. The existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium between the parties in period 2 is determined and the optimal acquisition prices
and (re)manufacturing quantities are found. Moreover, the optimal manufacturing quantity for
the OEM for period 1 is found. In the main part of the study, the case in which the new and
remanufactured products are sold for the same price is analyzed. Several managerial insights
131
for this case are obtained through sensitivity analyses. First of all, it is determined that OEM’s
acquisition price only depends on its cost structure, not on IO’s acquisition price which implies
that the OEM does not compete for collecting cores. It is also found that remanufacturing
is a profitable option for the OEM when it has a dominance in collecting the available cores
and remanufacturing leads cost savings. Moreover, when the cost benefit of remanufacturing
diminishes or the IO improve its ability (compared to the OEM) to collect the available cores,
the OEM manufactures less in the first period to protect its overall market share.
Afterwards, the case where consumers have lower willingness to pay for the remanufactured
products is considered and the effects of the parameters on the optimal production quantities and
acquisition prices are determined to be similar with the case of indistinguishable remanufactured
products. As expected, when remanufactured products are values less than new products, the
acquisition prices offered both by the OEM and IO decreases, and remanufacturing becomes less
profitable overall.
In Chapter 4, it is assumed that the consumers’ willingness to pay for the products is
uniformly distributed which leads to linear inverse demand functions. In further research, other
distributions can also be used for modeling consumers’ willingness to pay for the products. Other
possible research areas are to consider random demand and competition between more than two
parties can be considered. Finally, capacity restrictions can be included.
Chapter 5 studies supply chain cooperation among OEMs who can jointly invest in activities
to collect used products and addresses the research question When does cooperation lead to joint
cost-savings, and how should these savings be allocated among the firms? Using cooperative game
theory we find that comparable benefits per collected item provides an important incentive for
OEMs to set up a joint collection network. Indeed, for the case with equal benefits per collected
used item, which for instance arises if OEMs use the same recovery technology, we show that the
grand coalition is always formed for any number of players and all settings of other parameters
in the considered model. The analysis of the two player game shows that if cost asymmetry does
exist, then a coalition is more likely to be formed if the OEM with a lower benefit per collected
item has a higher market share. So, similar sized market shares do not necessarily motivate
OEMs to cooperate, but similar individual return rates do.
An intuitive finding is that the OEMs are more likely to jointly set up a network if there are
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higher economies of scale. In the absence of economies of scale, there is obviously no benefit from
cooperation. For the case with full economies of scale, the grand coalition is always beneficial.
The latter is not straightforward, as the grand coalition forces all participants to use the same
collection network and therefore to settle on the same return rate, although their individual
preferences may vary considerably. For both discussed special cases, either with equal benefits
per core or full economies of scale, the cooperation game is monotone, superadditive and convex.
From these properties, it is obtained that the well-known and easy-to-apply proportional rule
is an efficient way to allocate the total benefits of the grand coalition. An interesting further
research direction is that varying economies of scale for different sets of OEMs could be consid-
ered, depending for instance on the geographical overlap of their markets. Another interesting
direction for further research is to simultaneously consider competition between OEMs in selling
new products and cooperation in collecting returns. This could be modelled as a two-stage
game. Finally, competition of OEMs with 3rd party remanufacturers can also be considered.
To conclude, the starting point of our research was to provide analytical tools to firms for
optimal strategies in hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing systems. To achieve this goal, we
analyze different scenarios in each chapter of this thesis by building mathematical model and
determine an OEM’s optimal core acquisition, production and pricing strategy and investigate
profitability of remanufacturing. The main findings of this thesis are as follows. If there are
different return types acquired by the OEM, it is suboptimal to apply equal profits to remanu-
factured items. In the case of capacitated production setting, remanufacturing can be used to
reduce production cost or increase production. Also, if remanufacturing requires more capacity
or is more costly than manufacturing, it may still be profitable for an OEM. In the case of
competition with an IO the ability of core collection is vital for an OEM for profitable man-
ufacturing. Finally, cooperation with other OEMs in product returns channel is profitable for
an OEM if the OEMs have similar cost benefits (similar recovery technologies). In this thesis
we consider different scenarios and as described above further research directions are mainly to
consider these scenarios simultaneously. For instance, cooperation between the OEMs in the
product returns channel while competing in the sales market and competition between an OEM
and IO in capacitated setting with different return types can be considered.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Closed loop supply chains en de mogelijkheid tot hergebruik van producten zijn in toenemende
mate onderwerp van onderzoek in zowel de industrie als de academische wereld. De populariteit
van deze onderzoeksgebieden kan gemakkelijk verklaard worden door de economische crisis en
de toegenomen aandacht voor duurzaam ondernemen. De uitputting van natuurlijke hulpbron-
nen, het tekort aan belangrijke mineralen en metalen en het afvalvraagstuk van giftige stoffen
geven een directe aanleiding om bepaalde grondstoffen en producten opnieuw te gebruiken. Re-
manufacturing is een geavanceerde product recovery strategie waarin gebruikte producten een
behandeling ondergaan zodat ze gegarandeerd weer ”zo goed als nieuw” zijn. Dit proefschrift
richt zich op remanufacturing en heeft tot doel om analytische hulpmiddelen te ontwikkelen
waarmee bedrijven optimale prijsstelling-, productie- en remanufacturing-strategiee¨n kunnen
bepalen. Om met toegespitst onderzoek aan deze brede doelstelling te kunnen voldoen, zijn ver-
scheidende onderzoeksartikelen in dit proefschrift gebundeld. Elk artikel vormt een hoofdstuk
en richt zich op een specifieke vraagstelling die betrekking heeft op n of meerdere aspecten van
remanufacturing.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt zowel het inkoopmanagement van gebruikte producten als de pri-
jsstelling van nieuwe en gerecirculeerde producten, en tracht de volgende onderzoeksvraag te
beantwoorden: Wat zijn de optimale hoeveelheid en kwaliteit van de in te zamelen gebruikte
artikelen en wat is de prijs waartegen nieuwe en gerecirculeerde producten moeten worden
verkocht? De toegevoegde waarde van dit hoofdstuk bestaat uit de gelijktijdige behandeling van
twee belangrijke remanufacturing activiteiten, namelijk het inkoopmanagement van gebruikte
goederen en de prijsstelling van nieuwe en gerecirculeerde producten. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een
OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) beschouwd die nieuwe items produceert en bovendien
geretourneerde artikelen recirculeert. De geretourneerde artikelen zijn onderverdeeld in verschil-
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lende categoriee¨n, afhankelijk van de staat waarin ze verkeren. De OEM bepaalt de hoeveelheid
aan te kopen gebruikte artikelen in elke categorie, de bijbehorende inkoopprijzen en de verkoop-
prijzen van nieuwe en gerecirculeerde artikelen. Hierbij is het van belang dat verondersteld
wordt dat consumenten bereid zijn meer te betalen voor nieuwe dan voor gerecirculeerde goed-
eren. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een algoritme gentroduceerd waarmee de optimale oplossing in
gesloten vorm bepaald kan worden. De voornaamste bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk zijn als
volgt. Overeenkomstig met bestaande resultaten in de literatuur hangt de winst per nieuw
geproduceerd item alleen af van de productiekosten. De winst per gerecirculeerd item is niet
gelijk voor elke categorie, maar is hoger naarmate de totale kosten voor inkoop en remanu-
facturing lager zijn. Hoewel men het in de praktijk vanzelfsprekend dan wel eerlijk vindt om
nieuwe en gebruikte goederen met dezelfde winst te verkopen, blijkt uit Hoofdstuk 2 dat dit
suboptimaal is. In toekomstig onderzoek zou men kunnen kijken naar een model dat meerdere
periodes omvat en waar het aantal gebruikte producten dat beschikbaar is voor remanufactur-
ing afhangt van het aantal verkochte items in de voorgaande periode. Daarnaast zou men voor
elk type gebruikt product de verkoopprijs afzonderlijk kunnen vaststellen, of de mogelijkheid
van een extra remanufacturer in ogenschouw kunnen nemen. In Hoofdstuk 3 komen de vol-
gende onderzoeksvragen aan bod: (i) Wat is de invloed van remanufacturing op de optimale
capaciteits- en productiebeslissingen? (ii) Blijft remanufacturing rendabel als het duurder dan
wel capaciteitintensiever wordt? De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk aan de bestaande
literatuur is het analyseren van het gecombineerde effect van de kosten en het capaciteitsgebruik
van remanufacturing op de productie- en capaciteitsbeslissingen enerzijds en op de rentabiliteit
van remanufacturing anderzijds. De analyse is uitgevoerd voor een twee-perioden model; in
de eerste periode worden de productiecapaciteit en het productieaantal voor periode n bepaald
en in de tweede periode het productieaantal voor periode twee en het aantal te recirculeren
producten. Dit wordt gedaan voor drie verschillende scenarios, waarin de relatieve kosten en
capaciteitsbehoeftes varie¨ren. Als eerste wordt het scenario dat het meest realistisch is en dat
de meeste voorkeur geniet beschouwd. In dit scenario is remanufacturing minder kostbaar en
minder capaciteitsintensief dan nieuwe productie. Voor alle capaciteits- en productiebeslissingen
worden oplossingen in gesloten vorm afgeleid. Deze oplossingen worden gebruikt om een gevoe-
ligheidsanalyse uit te voeren. De belangrijkste bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk zijn als volgt.
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In sommige gevallen neemt remanufacturing de plaats in van nieuwe productie zodat de kosten
afnemen terwijl de totale productie in de tweede periode (nieuw plus remanufacturing) ongewi-
jzigd blijft. Er zijn echter ook gevallen waarin remanufacturing de totale productiehoeveelheid
verhoogt. Bijzonder interessant is dat remanufacturing, hoewel minder kapitaalintensief, soms
leidt tot een verhoogde kapitaalinjectie. In dergelijke gevallen wordt de extra investering gedaan
om de productie in periode n en daarmee het aantal geretourneerde producten in periode twee
te verhogen. Er zijn echter ook gevallen waarin sprake is van overcapaciteit in de eerste periode
en waarin de invoering van remanufacturing wel degelijk tot een daling van de capaciteitsin-
vestering leidt. De scenario’s waarin remanufacturing duurder of capaciteitsintensiever is dan
nieuwe productie worden geanalyseerd in een numerieke studie. Het blijkt dat het scenario
waarin remanufacturing duurder is veruit het minst gunstig is. Remanufacturing leidt daarente-
gen tot aanzienlijke kostenvoordelen wanneer het relatief capaciteitsintensief is, mits de kosten
en marktcondities zo zijn dat er voldoende capaciteit is gedurende de tweede periode van de
levenscyclus van het product. De invoering van een stochastisch retourneringspercentage om
onzekerheid op de markt te modelleren zou een interessante uitbreiding van het model zijn
voor toekomstig onderzoek. Daarnaast kan de levenscyclus van het product waarheidsgetrouwer
gemodelleerd worden door deze in meer dan twee periodes onder te verdelen. Tenslotte zou men
het aantal spelers op de markt kunnen uitbreiden, varie¨rend van het aantal inzamelaars van ge-
bruikte producten tot het aantal OEMs, en zou concurrentie tussen inzamelaars van gebruikte
producten en / of de verkoop van nieuwe dan wel gerecirculeerde goederen kunnen worden on-
derzocht. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert het effect dat concurrentie met een Independent Operator
(IO, een onafhankelijk ondernemer) heeft op de remanufacturing-strategie van een OEM in een
twee-perioden model. De volgende onderzoeksvragen komen aan bod: (i) Wat zijn de optimale
productie- en prijsstellingstrategiee¨n van de spelers in een supply chain wanneer er sprake is
van concurrentie? (ii) Wat is het effect van concurrentie op de remanufacturing-strategie? De
belangrijkste bijdrage van het model aan de bestaande literatuur is dat er, naast de concurrentie
om marktaandeel, sprake is van concurrentie bij het opkopen van gebruikte producten. In dit
hoofdstuk wordt het unieke Nash-evenwicht tussen de partijen in periode twee bepaald evenals
de optimale acquisitieprijzen, de te produceren en de te recirculeren hoeveelheden. Daarnaast
wordt de optimale productiehoeveelheid van de OEM in periode n berekend. In dit hoofdstuk
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staat het scenario centraal waarin de nieuwe en gerecirculeerde producten tegen dezelfde prijs
worden verkocht. Door middel van gevoeligheidsanalyses worden voor dit scenario verschil-
lende bestuurlijke inzichten verkregen. Allereerst wordt aangetoond dat de inkoop van de OEM
alleen afhangt van de kostenstructuur en niet van de inkoopprijs van de IO. Dit impliceert dat
de OEM niet concurreert op de inkoop van gebruikte goederen. Daarnaast wordt aangetoond
dat remanufacturing rendabel is als de OEM een dominerende positie heeft op de markt van
gebruikte producten en als remanufacturing tot kostenbesparingen leidt. Wanneer het kosten-
voordeel van recirculatie afneemt of wanneer de IO ten opzichte van de OEM beter in staat
is om de beschikbare gebruikte goederen in te zamelen, dan produceert de OEM bovendien
minder in de eerste periode om zijn totale marktaandeel te beschermen. Na de analyse van
het geval waarin nieuwe en gebruikte goederen evenveel opleveren, wordt een scenario bekeken
waarin consumenten minder willen betalen voor gerecirculeerde producten. Het blijkt dat de
effecten van de parameters op de optimale productiehoeveelheden en acquisitieprijzen vergelijk-
baar zijn met het geval waarin gerecirculeerde producten niet te onderscheiden zijn van nieuwe
producten. Logischerwijs dalen de verkoopprijzen van zowel de OEM als de IO voor gerecir-
culeerde goederen wanneer deze minder waard zijn dan nieuwe producten. Tegelijkertijd neemt
daarmee de winstgevendheid van remanufacturing af. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt aangenomen dat
de bereidheid van consumenten om te betalen uniform verdeeld is, wat leidt tot lineaire inverse
vraagfuncties. In toekomstig onderzoek zou men andere verdelingsfuncties kunnen introduceren
om de bereidheid tot betalen van consumenten te modelleren. Daarnaast zou men gevallen met
stochastische vraag of concurrentie tussen meerdere partijen kunnen onderzoeken. Tenslotte
kunnen capaciteitsbeperkingen in het model worden opgenomen. In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt een
samenwerkingsverband tussen OEMs in een supply chain bestudeerd, waarbij de OEMs geza-
menlijk kunnen investeren in activiteiten om gebruikte producten in te zamelen. De studie in
dit hoofdstuk is gericht op de volgende onderzoeksvraag: Wanneer leidt samenwerking tot geza-
menlijke kostenbesparingen, en hoe moeten deze besparingen onderling worden verdeeld? Met
behulp van coperatieve speltheorie leiden we af dat gelijke opbrengsten per ingezameld item
OEMs een belangrijke prikkel geven om een gezamenlijk inzamelnetwerk op te zetten. Er is
sprake van gelijke opbrengsten als OEMs bijvoorbeeld gebruik maken van dezelfde hersteltech-
nologie. Voor dit soort gevallen tonen we aan dat de grand coalition altijd wordt gevormd,
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onafhankelijk van het aantal spelers of de parameterwaarden in het onderliggende model. Dit
wil zeggen dat alle OEMs deelnemen aan het samenwerkingsverband. Uit de analyse van het
geval met twee spelers volgt dat als de kostenstructuur van de OEMs niet symmetrisch is, er een
grotere kans op een coalitie is indien de OEM met een lagere opbrengst per ingezameld item een
hoger marktaandeel heeft. Een gelijke verdeling van marktaandelen stimuleert OEMs dus niet
noodzakelijkerwijs tot samenwerking, terwijl vergelijkbare individuele retourneringspercentages
dat wel doen. Een intutieve bevinding is dat de OEMs eerder geneigd zijn een gezamenlijk
netwerk op te zetten als de schaalvoordelen groter zijn. Bij het ontbreken van schaalvoordelen is
er uiteraard geen reden tot samenwerking. Indien er sprake is van volledige schaalvoordelen dan
is de grand coalition altijd voordelig. Dit laatste is niet voor de hand liggend, omdat de grand
coalition alle deelnemers dwingt om gebruik te maken van hetzelfde inzamelnetwerk en hetzelfde
retourneringspercentage te accepteren, terwijl hun individuele voorkeuren aanzienlijk kunnen
verschillen. Voor beide speciale gevallen, dat wil zeggen met gelijke opbrengsten per ingezameld
product of met volledige schaalvoordelen, is het coperatieve spel monotoon, superadditief en
convex. Met behulp van deze eigenschappen kan worden afgeleid dat de bekende en eenvoudig
toe te passen evenredigheidsregel een efficie¨nte manier vormt om de totale baten van de grand
coalition te verdelen. Als interessante richting voor vervolgonderzoek zou men kunnen kijken
naar uiteenlopende schaalvoordelen voor verschillende combinaties van OEMs, die bijvoorbeeld
afhangen van de geografische overlap van hun markten. Ander mogelijk vervolgonderzoek zou
zich kunnen richten op een model dat tegelijkertijd concurrentie tussen OEMs bij de verkoop
van producten en samenwerking bij het inzamelen van gebruikte producten beschouwt. Dit zou
gemodelleerd kunnen worden als een spel dat uit twee opeenvolgende fases bestaat. Tenslotte
kan de concurrentie van OEMs met onafhankelijke remanufacturers ook worden overwogen.
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat het uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek was om analytis-
che instrumenten te ontwikkelen waarmee bedrijven optimale strategiee¨n in hybride productie- /
remanufacturing-systemen kunnen bepalen. Om dit doel te bereiken hebben we in elk hoofdstuk
van dit proefschrift aan de hand van wiskundige modellen verschillende scenarios geanalyseerd
en hebben we de optimale productie-, remanufacturing- en prijsstellingstrategie van een OEM
bepaald. De belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift zijn als volgt. Indien er verschillende
categoriee¨n gebruikte producten worden ingezameld door de OEM, dan is het suboptimaal om
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alle categoriee¨n met gelijke winst te verkopen. In het geval van een gelimiteerde productieca-
paciteit kan remanufacturing worden gebruikt om de productiekosten te verminderen of om
de productie te verhogen. Zelfs als remanufacturing meer capaciteit in beslag neemt of duur-
der is dan nieuwe productie, kan het nog steeds winstgevend zijn voor een OEM. Wanneer er
sprake is van concurrentie met een IO dan is het vermogen van een OEM om gebruikte goed-
eren in te zamelen van wezenlijk belang om de productie winstgevend te laten zijn. Tot slot
is samenwerking met andere OEMs in het retourneringskanaal winstgevend als de deelnemende
OEMs vergelijkbare kostenvoordelen hebben (bijvoorbeeld door het gebruik van vergelijkbare
hersteltechnologiee¨n). In dit proefschrift beschouwen we verschillende scenario’s en zoals reeds
beschreven liggen mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek vooral in het gelijktijdig analyseren
van verschillende scenarios. Zo zou men kunnen kijken naar een setting waarin OEMs een samen-
werkingsverband aangaan in het retourneringskanaal terwijl ze concurreren op de afzetmarkt.
Een andere interessante optie is om onderzoek te doen naar concurrentie tussen een OEM en
een IO als er sprake is van verschillende categoriee¨n gebruikte goederen en een gelimiteerde
productiecapaciteit.
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